http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,77967,00.html

It is clear that given the suspected tile damage, at a minimum Columbia should have been given a modified yaw re-entry.
The question is why it was not.

There had to be some kind of change in the tile damage reporting and response system between May 2000 and January 2003.

The launch pad camera failure has already been commented on.

It may be that there was no system in place, and that instead there was an informal network of old hands. It may be that Chairman Boehlert's concerns about a NASA "brain drain" were manifested in the Columbia failure.

On the other hand, this failure may have parallels with the Challenger failure. In the case of Challenger, o-ring blow-bys had been noted, but were not considered fatal, as the blow-by's had not resulted in shuttle failure. No consideration was made of the use of a new untested sealant in the solid rocket motors, or that the blow-bys were temperature sensitive. In the case of Columbia, earlier tile damage had not resulted in shuttle loss, but perhaps consideration was not given to the use of a new thoroughly tested foam on the external tank, or that earlier re-entries had flown a modified yaw path.

The only way of determining what failed here is going to be by examining in exhaustive depth the earlier successful functioning of the tile damage reporting and response system in May of 2000. This is the kind of research which Logsdon could do very well, but whether he will accept that work, or instead try for something that he perceives to be of more influence, is an open question.

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