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STRATFOR.com
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THE INTERNET SOURCE FOR GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE
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War Plan: Part I U.S. Must Create Theaters of Operations
September 24, 2001
Summary
In responding to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, Washington must face an enemy with numerous strengths while avoiding playing into the strategy of Osama bin Laden and his backers. To achieve its goals, the United States must create several theaters of operations, including in Afghanistan, North America and throughout the world. This week STRATFOR will closely analyze each theater and how the United States will operate there.
Analysis
The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon paralyzed the New York financial markets for four days and shut down the air transport system completely for a similar period of time. The attacks also degraded the U.S. economy substantially, both by its direct effects on economic activity and by its impact on public confidence.
Washington has asserted, with reason, that the attacks were organized by Al-Qa'ida, a group founded by Osama bin Laden. The United States must and will respond, but it must also take into account the strengths of its formidable enemy. For their part, bin Laden's forces and Afghanistan's ruling Taliban have likely developed a war plan to exploit the perceived weaknesses of the United States.
Several factors point to a degree of sophistication and dedication among the attackers that is extraordinary. First, they maintained operational security while moving personnel and large sums of money intercontinentally. They clearly understood the parameters of U.S. technical and human intelligence and developed methods for evading them.
Second, the selected targets were also chosen for both symbolic value and the ability to inflict massive casualties and tremendous secondary effects. There is no reason whatever to believe the attackers did not understand the likely outcome of their operation.
Last, the operational security of the organization behind the attacks was not breached after the strikes. U.S. security and intelligence services clearly cannot be certain at this point whether other cells have been deployed in the United States and what their missions might be. If there are additional cells, they retain the advantage of tactical surprise at the moment. And even if there are no additional cells, the United States must still behave as if there are.
(The Rest of the Story)
(c) 2001 Stratfor, Inc.
Dan
War Plan: Part I . . .