<
--------------
STRATFOR.com
--------------
THE INTERNET SOURCE FOR GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE
If it’s in the news, it’s too late...
Ground War Strategies Part 2: The Northern Alliance Offensive
November 7, 2001
Summary
The Pentagon is planning ground operations in Afghanistan because an air campaign alone will not defeat the Taliban. A strategic offensive by the Northern Alliance, with extensive U.S. air support, appears the most desirable option. But with opposition troops unlikely to capture Kabul before winter falls, the United States must prepare ground forces to launch attacks in Afghanistan next spring.
Analysis
It is increasingly clear that the U.S. air campaign alone will not break up the Taliban's resistance in Afghanistan. With the harsh Afghan winter fast approaching and the Taliban as defiant as ever, there is no hope that the war in Afghanistan will be over soon. The Pentagon must explore ground war options in the country.
Any ground force assembled from abroad would not be able to launch before spring. Only forces already in Afghanistan have a chance to defeat the Taliban before winter. The U.S. command appears to be pinning its hopes on the Northern Alliance, the only organized military force opposing the Taliban on the ground. However, the Northern Alliance lacks the manpower, skills and equipment necessary to defeat the Taliban in combat near Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif.
The Northern Alliance -- a loose coalition of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras -- has been fighting the Taliban for seven years with little success. When the United States launched air strikes a month ago, it did not immediately try to help the Northern Alliance by bombing the Taliban frontline positions.
The Bush administration did this for two reasons. First, it was mindful that crucial coalition supporter Pakistan is a foe of Northern Alliance. Second, the administration hoped that an air campaign and covert attempts to turn Pushtun tribes in the country against the Taliban would do much to achieve its goals. Washington believed that the Pushtuns themselves would overthrow the hard-line regime of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar. But attempts by prominent Pushtun leaders, including recently executed opposition leader Abdul Haq, have failed so far.
A week ago, Washington switched its strategy to heavy bombing of Taliban forces opposing Northern Alliance troops in positions north of Kabul, south of the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif and close to the Afghan-Tajik border in the northeast. The Bush administration apparently believes that its massive support to the Northern Alliance will not alienate Pakistan, since even with the fall of Kabul, the war would be far from over, and a role for pro-Pakistani Pushtuns in a future government could still be negotiated.
The United States hopes the bombing will encourage the Northern Alliance to launch a major offensive. So far, the opposition has not undertaken an attack against Kabul. Minor attacks at Mazar-e-Sharif have been repulsed, although some tactical success was reported 40-miles south of the city on Nov. 6.
PLANS
(The Rest of the Story)
(c) 2001 Stratfor, Inc.
Dan
The Northern Alliance Offensive . . .