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STRATFOR.com
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THE INTERNET SOURCE FOR GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE
If it’s in the news, it’s too late...
WAR DIARY: Tuesday, Oct. 22, 2002
Monday was spent with defining the shape of the pending U.S. offensive. The roles of Iran and Turkey dominated the day, along with news of a force of Iraqi dissidents being raised for combat. Another attack on an Israeli bus raised questions of how long Israeli leaders will restrain themselves, and what the consequences of another assault on the Palestinians will have for the regional dynamic. Finally, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice gave a seminar on the differences between Iraq and North Korea; notes were taken by all.
Image Credit: Stratfor.com.
One of the key pieces of U.S. strategy against al Qaeda in Afghanistan was the use of indigenous forces to supply critical manpower. Applying the same strategy to Iraq has been difficult, since the only potential force has been inside the Iraqi army -- and this poses obvious political problems for the United States. Thus, the public announcement of what has been fairly well known -- namely, that the United States is training exiled Iraqi dissidents to serve as an indigenous force -- is significant, if not for their war-fighting capability (which is highly doubtful) than for their potential role as the political nucleus of a new government.
Most of the recruits will be coming from the Iraqi National Congress, headed by Ahmed Chalabi. Reports of training have been surfacing for months. It appears that the dissident force might contain a small core of well-trained, motivated troops and a much larger segment of much lesser-trained forces useful for political purposes. The problem is that under the best of circumstances, this force will not be able to serve the decisive role that the Northern Alliance and other forces played in Afghanistan.
Iranian leaders went ballistic on Monday over reports that they had agreed to provide the United States and Britain two bases for operations in Iraq. According to a variety of reports, Tehran agreed during meetings with British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw to give the United States the use of bases at Dehloran and Kermanshah. From a geopolitical point of view, the deal makes great sense: If Iraq is devastated, Iran is the major regional winner, likely to dominate the Persian Gulf. From a strictly theological standpoint, however, cooperating with the Great Satan is unacceptable. Iran does not want to discourage a U.S. attack at all, but it cannot afford to be seen as contributing materially to the attack. Tehran's vehement denials were fascinating for their intensity, if nothing else.
(The Rest of the Story)
(c) 2001 Stratfor, Inc.
Dan
War Diary: Tuesday, Oct. 22, 2002 . . .