There are damn few strategies in the history of warfare that came complete with a guarantee of victory.

Every general goes into a battle with the best plan he has, and hopes like hell the plan will work. Maybe Rumsfeld's will, maybe it won't. His career probably depends on it. "Victory has a hundred fathers, while defeat is an orphan."

But there are no guarantees had he gone the "overwhelming force" route either.

Although it's obvious you are not "antiwar" as such, I notice a parallel with the original antiwar theme (heard often on this board) of listing all the dire potential consequences of going to war, while ignoring all the potential consequences of NOT doing so, some of which were worse.

The "overwhelming force" option has drawbacks too.

Had we taken the time to build up the forces to the extent that would have made everyone happy, it's possible we would have gone into summer or beyond. In addition, a slow advance of a large force may have permitted more sabotage, and of course, more time for Saddam to prepare himself and his troops. This was a prime reason for moving very rapidly into Iraq. It has been pointed out by some experts that had our rapidly-moving force been much larger, the forward supply problem may have become insurmountable.

There are other issues with a huge force as well, including personnel availability, costs, transport, and others. Military types would probably be able to point others out.

I haven't studied these issues exactly, but you would have to admit they are issues with your alternative approach.

The Turkish screwup, the main problem with the current plan, is 20-20 hindsight. It looked to me almost until the last minute, particularly with the leadership change, that they were going to cave.