Some interesting items from the IISS, the think tank that provided some crucial analysis before the invasion of Iraq...

Regarding biological weapons:

Our net assessment of the current situation is that:

- Iraq has probably retained substantial growth media and BW agent (perhaps thousands of litres of anthrax) from pre 1991 stocks.

- The regime is capable of resuming BW Agent production on short notice (in weeks) from existing civilian facilities. It could have produced thousands of litres of anthrax, botulinum toxin and other agents since 1998. Actual stocks cannot be known.

- Iraqi production of viral agents is unknown as is the question of whether the regime possesses small pox.

Our net assessment of the current situation is that:

- Iraq has probably retained a few hundred tonnes of mustard and precursors for a few hundred tonnes of sarin/cyclosarin and perhaps similar amounts of VX from pre-1991 stocks.

- It is capable of resuming CW production on short notice (months) from existing civilian facilities. It could have produced hundreds of tonnes of agent (mustard and nerve agents) since 1998. In these circumstances, it is not possible accurately to estimate present stocks.

The lack of a major WMD find, unexpected by experts given Iraq’s concealment and dispersal policies, nevertheless engendered a new debate as to the legitimacy of the war’s motivation.

In the end, the most important legitimacy for the operation may well come most from a successful process of political reconstruction. For an administration that was initially critical of the view that foreign policy was a branch of social work, and that ‘nation-building’ was an appropriate purpose for US power, it is ironic that in Iraq, these are now at core US objectives, and are so for the most vital security reasons.

Also important in the ultimate judgement about the war will be the impact it has on the campaign against terrorism.

It is possible that the audacity and success of the Iraq intervention has intimidated anti-American terrorists as well as rogue regimes. The attacks by suicide bombers at three housing compounds in Riyadh earlier today show that this would be an unwise conclusion. The full effect of coercive regime-change and of the expanded US footprint and influence in the Gulf region on al-Qaeda and its followers may take time to be seen. The US military build-up for the 1991 Gulf War and the subsequent long-term American presence in Saudi Arabia were Osama bin Laden’s prime motivators, yet major al-Qaeda terrorist operations did not come until years later. And although bin Laden’s attempt to make common cause between al-Qaeda supporters worldwide and the Iraqi people has been wrong-footed by the positive reception that most Iraqis have accorded American and British troops, this may mean only that the critical momentum required to propel actual terrorist operations may take longer to generate. A strong counter-terrorism campaign remains a critical necessity for years to come.