It's been reported that something like 28 pages of material about Saudi Arabia have been deleted for "national security" reasons. But there's quite a bit of material left that seems to point the finger of suspicion at the Saudis. The Saudis are pissed--more on that later.

I've actually been slogging through the report. Here's what I found today about Saudi Arabia. Some material in the report is marked "[deleted]". Other material between square brackets has been paraphrased (by them) to sanitize it.

[Regarding Saudi Arabia, former FBI Director Louis Freeh testified that, following the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, the FBI “was able to forge an effective working relationship with the Saudi police and Interior Ministry.” A considerable amount of personal effort by Director Freeh helped to secure what he described as “unprecedented and invaluable” assistance in the Khobar Towers bombing investigation from the Saudi Ambassador to the United States and the Saudi Interior Minister. By contrast, the Committees heard testimony from U.S. Government personnel that Saudi officials had been uncooperative and often did not act on information implicating Saudi nationals].

[According to a U. S. Government official, it was clear from about 1996 that the Saudi Government would not cooperate with the United States on matters relating to Usama Bin Ladin. [deleted], reemphasized the lack of Saudi cooperation and stated that there was little prospect of future cooperation regarding Bin Ladin. [deleted] told the Joint Inquiry that he believed the U.S. Government’s hope of eventually obtaining Saudi cooperation was unrealistic because Saudi assistance to the U.S. Government on this matter is contrary to Saudi national interests].

[A U. S. Government official testified to the Joint Inquiry on this issue [deleted] as follows:

[deleted]….[F]or the most part it was a very troubled relationship where the Saudis were not providing us quickly or very vigorously with response to it. Sometimes they did, many times they didn’t. It was just very slow in coming.

The Treasury Department General Counsel testified at the July 23, 2002 hearing about the lack of Saudi cooperation:

There is an almost intuitive sense, however, that things are not being volunteered. So I want to fully inform you about it, that we have to ask and we have to seek and we have to strive. I will give you one-and-a-half examples. The first is, after some period, the Saudis have agreed to the designation of a man named Julaydin, who is notoriously involved in all of this; and his designation will be public within the next 10 days. They came forward to us two weeks ago and said, okay, we think we should go forward with the designation and a freeze order against Mr. Julaydin. We asked, what do you have on him? Because they certainly know what we have on him, because we shared it as we tried to convince them that they ought to join us. The answer back was, nothing new.

I think that taxes credulity, or there is another motive we are not being told.

[A number of U. S. Government officials complained to the Joint Inquiry about a lack of Saudi cooperation in terrorism investigations both before and after the September 11 attacks. ]. A high-level U. S. Government officer cited greater Saudi cooperation when asked how the September 11 attacks might have been prevented. In May 2001, the U.S. Government became aware that an individual in Saudi Arabia was in contact with a senior al-Qa’ida operative and was most likely aware of an upcoming al-Qa’ida operation. [deleted].

The Saudis' latest move has been to demand that the material about them be declassified, asserting it will clear their name. This is an intriguing development, and it's interesting to game what this means.

1) Face value: The Saudis are innocent and there's nothing in the classified parts that would implicate them.
(But then, why was any material classified? Was it just a gambit to piss off the Saudis?)

2) The Saudis have dirty hands, but believe that there's nothing in the classified portions that would embarrass them.
(Maybe so, but then again, why was it classified? The Tom Clancyesque explanation: A double-agent leaked to them that the material's clean, but it's not. Saudis will demand its release, and then be implicated. Bush Administration can tell the Saudis privately that they had no choice.)

3) The Saudis have dirty hands and don't care what the material would reveal.
(What? Why?)

4) The Saudis are posturing, knowing that the material cannot be declassified.
4a) The material contains genuine national security secrets that cannot be revealed.
4b) The classified material is embarrassing not only to the Saudis, but to the Bush Administration or other persons still in power and in a position to force its classification.
(Oooooh! Juicy!

Seriously: What weakens 4a is that this material is about Saudi Arabia and, reportedly, about its noncooperation and possible ties to Al Qaeda. If the concern is to protect sources, why not just do the same detailed blacking-out as used throughout the report to protect specific information about sources?

As for 4b: Well, gosh, I dunno..there's a huge body of speculation about ties between the oil interests of the Bush family and friends and the Saudis, but nothing I'd personally stand behind. Not much I really can say, I guess. I'm confident that others will fill in that box.)

How will this play out eventually? Place your bets!