Time magazine's online edition is reporting that national security advisor Condoleezza Rice is squirming a bit over her possible appearance before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States:

Two government sources tell TIME that National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice is arguing over ground rules for her appearance in part because she does not want to testify under oath or, according to one source, in public.

Given Ms. Rice's incredible comment after 911 that no one “..could have predicted that they would try to use a…hijacked airplane as a missile”, Dr. Rice's apprehensions may be understandable.

One Republican commissioner says a comment by Rice last year—that no one “could have predicted that they would try to use a…hijacked airplane as a missile”—was "an unfortunate comment . . . that was, of course, a wrong-footed statement on its face," given that there was years of intelligence about Al Qaeda's interest in airplane attacks.

Time article

On 5-23-2003, Commission members questioned members of NORAD about that command's knowledge of and preparedness for the hijacked-airliner-as-weapon threat:

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Now let me ask you sir, whether the concept of terrorists using an airplane as a weapon was something unknown to the intelligence community on September 10th, 2001?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Very good question...

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Thank you.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
And I asked our staff to provide me some data on what they had that morning. As I said, Gen. Arnold was at the helm that morning. But basically, the comments I received from my staff was that there was no intelligence indication at any level within NORAD or DOD of a terrorist threat to commercial aviation prior to the attacks. And information from the daily Joint Chiefs Intelligence Report on the morning of September 11th indicated no specific dangers or threats within the country.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
My question Sir, and I mean no disrespect but we will save time if you’ll listen to what I ask you. My question is: the concept of terrorists using airplanes as weapons was not something which was unknown to the U.S. Intelligence community on September 10th, 2001. Isn’t that fair to say?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
I would like the Intelligence community to address that. I would find it hard to believe that they hadn’t speculated against that. But it was unavailable to us at the time.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Well, let’s start for example with September 12th, 1994. A Cessna 150L crashed into the south lawn of the White House barely missing the building and killing the pilot. Similarly, in December of 1994, an Algerian armed Islamic group in Paris hijacked an Air France flight in Algiers and threatened to crash it into the Eiffel Tower. In October of 1996, the Intelligence community obtained information regarding an Iranian plot to hijack a Japanese plane over Israel and crash it into Tel Aviv. In August of 1998, the Intelligence community obtained information that a group of unidentified Arabs planned to fly an explosive-laden plane from a foreign country into the World Trade Center. The information was passed on to the FBI and the FAA. In September of 1998, the Intelligence community obtained information that Osama bin Laden’s next operation could possibly involve flying an aircraft loaded with explosives into a U.S. airport and detonating it. In August 2001, the Intelligence Community obtained information regarding a plot to either bomb the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi from an airplane or crash an airplane into it. In addition, in the Atlanta Olympics, the United States government and the Dept. of Justice and my colleague Jamie Gorelick were involved in planning against possible terrorist attacks at the Olympics, which included the potential of an aircraft flying into the stadium. In July 2001, the G8 Summit in Genoa, attended by our President - among the measures that were taken, were positioning surface-to-air missiles, ringing Genoa, closing the Genoa airport and restricting all airspace over Genoa. Was not this information, Sir, available to NORAD as of September 11th, 2001?

[...]

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner
Well, isn’t that a bit fatuous given the specific information that I’ve given you? It wasn’t in the minds of scriptwriters when the Algerians had actually hijacked a plane which they were attempting to fly into the Eiffel Tower and all the other scenarios which I’ve mentioned to you. I don’t mean to argue with you but my question is, Sir, given the awareness of the terrorists’ use of planes as weapons, how was it that NORAD was still focusing outward in protecting the United States against attacks from the Soviet Union or elsewhere and was not better prepared to defend against the hijackings scenarios of a commercial jet, laden with fuel, used as a weapon to target citizens of the United States? When you say, our training, our mission was vestigial, I think you said it in capsulated form but would you agree that on the basis of the information available, that there could have been better preparedness by NORAD to meet this threat?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
In retrospect, Sir, I think I would agree with your comment.

911 Commission Testimony: Remarks of NORAD Personnel: Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley, Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold, Col. Alan Scott

In a related story:

WASHINGTON—For some, it's blood money, a repugnant payoff they feel they have no choice but to accept.

For a handful of others, the process of claiming compensation is too painful: they find themselves paralyzed by grief and unable to reopen emotional wounds barely healed from the deaths of their loved ones in the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

But as many as 73 families see the process of U.S. government compensation as an attempt to protect those who should be held accountable for what they believe was mass murder.

They ignored a midnight deadline last night, their last chance to apply for government cash.

Families sue U.S., reject 9/11 `bribe'

alternate link

Commission chairman Thomas kean appeared to backpeddle a bit last week after his comments had been interpreted by some that he was pointing fingers at high officials;

"There are people that, if I was doing the job, would certainly not be in the position they were in at that time because they failed. They simply failed," Kean told CBS last week.

He said later he was talking of lower level officials...

But Kean "... was telling reporters last week to expect major revelations from the investigative hearings expected to begin in late January."

Kean, and others on the 911 commission have been accused by some of having a conflicts of interest, and there was a minor furor when outspoken commission member Max Clelland was promoted off the panel by Pres. Bush, who initially fought formation of the commission, and relented only under pressure from the four 9/11 moms from Jersey, and other victim's family members.

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