Transcript of some of the interview here.

Notice some of the items missing from the article Donald quoted.

Asked if he would have recommended an invasion knowing Iraq had no prohibited weapons, Powell replied: "I don't know, because it was the stockpile that presented the final little piece that made it more of a real and present danger and threat to the region and to the world." He said the "absence of a stockpile changes the political calculus; it changes the answer you get."

If CIA Director George Tenet had said a year ago today, if U.S. weapons inspector David Kay had said, that there are no stockpiles, would you still have recommended the invasion?

I don't know. I don't know, because it was the stockpile that presented the final little piece that made it more of a real and present danger and threat to the region and to the world.

But the fact of the matter is the considered judgment of the intelligence community, represented by George Tenet, and also independently by the United Kingdom and other intelligence agencies, suggested that the stockpiles were there. I can't go back and give you the hypothetical as to what I might have done.

But the absence of the stockpiles . . . .

The absence of a stockpile changes the political calculus. It changes the answer you get, the formula I laid out.

But the fact of the matter is that we went into this with the understanding that there was a stockpile and there were weapons, and for my own personal perspective, you know, I was the chairman for the first Gulf War, and we went in expecting to be hit with chemical weapons. We weren't hit with chemical weapons, but we found chemical weapons. And so it wasn't as if this was a figment of someone's imagination. . . . And so what assumption would one make some nine years after the inspectors had been moved, had been gone for four years? I think the assumption to make and the assumption that we came to, based on what the intelligence community gave to us, was that there were stockpiles present.