Even today, Iraq is not nearly disarmed. Based on highly credible intelligence, UNSCOM [the U.N. weapons inspectors] suspects that Iraq still has biological agents like anthrax, botulinum toxin, and clostridium perfringens in sufficient quantity to fill several dozen bombs and ballistic missile warheads, as well as the means to continue manufacturing these deadly agents. Iraq probably retains several tons of the highly toxic VX substance, as well as sarin nerve gas and mustard gas. This agent is stored in artillery shells, bombs, and ballistic missile warheads. And Iraq retains significant dual-use industrial infrastructure that can be used to rapidly reconstitute large-scale chemical weapons production.

--Scott Ritter in "The New Republic" in 1998

Ritter gave testimony to a Senate committee on September 3, 1998. A few excerpts:

...Iraq today is not disarmed, and remains an ugly threat to its neighbors and to world peace.

...I cannot speak on behalf of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Nuclear disarmament issues in Iraq are their purview. But what I can say is that we have clear evidence that Iraq is retaining prohibited weapons capabilities in the fields of chemical, biological and ballistic- missile delivery systems of a range of greater than 150 kilometers. And if Iraq has undertaken a concerted effort run at the highest levels inside Iraq to retain these capabilities, then I see no reason why they would not exercise the same sort of concealment efforts for their nuclear programs.

...SEN. LEVIN: Yeah, but would you agree that it's important that if there's a threat of force, that that force be implemented and not just made and then ignored? If you're going to make a threat of force to enforce a policy, you darn well better carry out that threat if you are thwarted. Would you agree with that?

MR. RITTER: Yes, sir. This is part of the cycle of confrontation and concession that I have been talking about, and we can't give concessions. If we have confrontation, it must have a resolution.

SEN. LEVIN: Yeah. Okay, and that means then if your threat of force is credible, it's got to be implementable, and there's got to be a will to use force if necessary once that threat is made. Now that's where we are. That's where we were when the Senate was looking at a resolution to see if we could support the use of force to implement that kind of a threat. But it's better not to make a threat if you're not going to carry it out than it is to make a threat and ignore it, 'cause you're really worse off if you make a threat and then not follow through with that threat. Would you agree with that?

MR. RITTER: Senator, the threat was made back in April 1991.

SEN. LEVIN: No, I mean threat of force.

MR. RITTER: The threat of force was made back in April 1991 when the Security Council together with the vote and pushing and backing of the United States passed the original cease-fire resolution. I don't see anything that would have caused the law to be altered. Iraq has not been disarmed. I would assume that that threat of force still exists today.

...SEN. BROWNBACK: And yet you were stopped on two occasions. In your opinion, in the absence of a robust inspection regime, how quickly could Iraq restart its weapons of mass destruction program?

MR. RITTER: Iraq has -- in my opinion, within a period of six months, simply put. Six months.

SEN. BROWNBACK: Do you have any information as to whether they are continuing with it to even today?

MR. RITTER: Yes, sir.

SEN. BROWNBACK: You do?

MR. RITTER: Yes, sir.

SEN. BROWNBACK: What's your opinion about that continuation of their weapons-of-mass-destruction program today?

MR. RITTER: They're -- Iraq has positioned itself today that once effective inspection regimes have been terminated, Iraq will be able to reconstitute the entirety of its former nuclear, chemical and ballistic missile delivery system capabilities within a period of six months.

...SEN. MCCAIN: And that's what's disturbing to so many of us. Seven months ago, the secretary of State threatened force if these inspections weren't allowed to be completed. And now apparently from what you and other evidence that we have, is the secretary of State is arguing against the completion of the inspections. I'd like to get back just for a second to the gravity of this situation. Do you believe that Saddam Hussein today has three nuclear weapons assembled -- lacking only the fissile material?

MR. RITTER: The Special Commission has intelligence information, which indicates that components necessary for three nuclear weapons exist, lacking the fissile material. Yes, sir.

SEN. MCCAIN: So that means to you that in what period of time, if these inspections cease, that Saddam Hussein will have that nuclear capability?

MR. RITTER: It's a question of how he chooses to acquire enriched uranium, either through indigenous enrichment or through procurement from abroad. If it's indigenous, it would take some time because the IAEA has effectively dismantled the internal enrichment -- but they have not dismantled the weaponization program per se.

SEN. MCCAIN: So what period of time are you talking about, roughly?

MR. RITTER: For a total reconstruction, it would be a period of several years to reconstruct enrichment capability. Yes, sir.

SEN. MCCAIN: And the biological and chemical?

MR. RITTER: That's a much less time frame. I believe within a period of six months Iraq could reconstitute its biological-weapons and chemical-weapons capability.

SEN. MCCAIN: And the missiles to deliver them?

MR. RITTER: Within a period of six months. We know in fact that Iraq has a plan to have a breakout scenario for reconstitution of long-range ballistic missiles within six months of the "go" signal from the president of Iraq.

SEN. MCCAIN: So it is your opinion that if these inspections are further emasculated, then within a six-month period of time, Saddam Hussein would have the capability to deliver a weapon of mass destruction?

MR. RITTER: Yes, sir.

SEN. MCCAIN: I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

...SEN. INHOFE: Okay. I had mentioned the statement about "kept in his box" as offering perhaps a false sense of security to the United States. We sat in the same room, I sat in the same chair, when Anthony Lake was up for his confirmation hearings to be the director of Central Intelligence. And during that period of time, it was my interpretation of his remarks that he gave the president this -- what I considered to be the greatest statement that served the greatest disservice to America, and that is when he said over 33 times that, "Now for the first time" -- this country in contemporary history -- "are there no missiles aimed at American children." And it's very disturbing when you are living in the threatening like we're living in right now, to hear those false senses of security. What I was going to ask you about was that you spending nine years over there know pretty much about the person of Saddam Hussein. You remember, nine months before Desert Storm, Saddam (Hussein ?) said -- and this is a quote: "Our missiles cannot reach Washington. If they could reach Washington, we would strike." Then shortly after the cease-fire, a statement that was made that, "If we had held off and not gone into Kuwait for five or six more years, we would have the missiles, the means of delivering the weapons that we have to deter the United States." Do you remember those statements?

MR. RITTER: Yes, sir.

SEN. INHOFE: Do you think, in your evaluation of the type of person that Saddam Hussein is, that he would hesitate in any way from using a weapon of mass destruction and delivering it to the United States, if he had the capability?

MR. RITTER: My experience with the Iraqi government is that it is a ruthless government and that it would carry out such a task if that was the decision of the president of Iraq.

...SEN. HAGEL: Following up on some of the questioning that has been presented here already this afternoon, on what might you have found if you had been allowed to pursue your job, your objective -- and we heard that, I think, rather clearly from you -- but let's take that beyond what you have already made very clear. What is the intent, do you believe, of Mr. Hussein?

MR. RITTER: The intent is clear; to retain the capability to possess weapons of mass destruction. Back in -- he made a strategic decision in the 1980s to get this capability. He's linked his capability directly to his person. And today his goal is to retain this capability, so that he can menace the region and project himself as a regional superpower.

SEN. HAGEL: Would it be fair to say to use potential nuclear/biological/chemical weapons to blackmail the region?

MR. RITTER: I believe that his past statements, especially concerning the threat in April 1990 to burn half of Israel, imply that that is indeed one of the tactics that he uses.

...SEN. SNOWE: And finally, one other question. Have you, during your years as an inspector, ever uncovered evidence which indicated direct personal interest by Saddam Hussein in specific chemical or biological weapons?

MR. RITTER: Yes, ma'am. We -- I mean, we have uncovered innumerable pieces of intelligence which indicate that the president of Iraq directs -- specifically directs -- the financing associated with covert procurement in this area and he also is the one responsible for directing the forces who do the actual acts of concealment. This is tied directly to the president of Iraq.

...SEN. ROBB: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one last question: Following up on the analysis, as well as the question that Senator Levin just asked -- and I share the collective appreciation of the entire committee for what you have done and for forcing all of us who have policy responsibilities to come to grips with the situation that confronts us. You have understandably been reluctant to suggest exactly what the executive branch of the United States government or other members of the Security Council might do in terms of the specific enforcement question. But I would ask you if you think that there is anything short of the suggestion that was just made by Senator Levin, in terms of the full application of military force, that would have accomplished your specific objections -- objectives as the leader of the inspection team. In other words, would -- is there anything short of that particular approach, in your judgment, that would have advanced your cause to discover and -- both the items and the methods of concealment -- could you take a shot at that as a -- my final question?

MR. RITTER: Okay, sir. Thank you. What -- again, you confront me with the position where, as an inspector, I could possibly taint a process of inspection that I want to -- I hope will continue, by trying to step into the purview of the Security Council or the United States. But what I would say is that in June 1996, when this process of confrontation and concession began, had the Security Council stepped up to the plate and taken decisive measures, the price we would have had to pay for compliance would have been small indeed. I think a minimal amount of force could have been applied to Iraq to get them to comply. But because the cycle of confrontation and concession has taken place now over the course of more than two years, and is continuing to take place today through Security Council resolutions that are being discussed where the secretary-general will be allowed to conduct a comprehensive review of the inspection team, the price that has to be paid today is much greater. What that price is, what exactly has to be used to compel Iraq, I can't define, but I know that it will be heavy; it will be significant.

SEN. ROBB: History is replete with examples where, if we had acted in some capacity sooner rather than later, the ultimate consequences might have been borne more easily. But given the situation as it exists today -- and I am not asking for any specifics -- just is there in your judgment anything short of the application of sustained force and all that that implies that would have advanced your program?

MR. RITTER: No, sir.

Read it. Don't just look at my excerpts. Scroll down to Ritter's statements, and read them all. Read the whole damn transcript. It's exceedingly instructive in showing how Democratic leaders thought back when they had the Presidency. Might be worth a post of its own.

Now, the "New Ritter:"

Does Iraq truly threaten the existence of our nation? If one takes at face value the rhetoric emanating from the Bush administration, it would seem so. According to President Bush and his advisers, Iraq is known to possess weapons of mass destruction and is actively seeking to reconstitute the weapons production capabilities that had been eliminated by UN weapons inspectors from 1991 to 1998, while at the same time barring the resumption of such inspections.

I bear personal witness through seven years as a chief weapons inspector in Iraq for the United Nations to both the scope of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and the effectiveness of the UN weapons inspectors in ultimately eliminating them.

--Scott Ritter in an article in 2002

In 1998, after seven years of inspections, Ritter in an earlier statement seems utterly convinced that Iraq is dangerous. Later, Ritter declares that he had come to a completely different conclusion after those same seven years. We are not talking about information he learned after the war, or even between 1998 and 2003. He claims to have drawn two completely different conclusions in 1998.

As with Clarke, the only difference I see is who was President at the time each of the statements were made. There are other issues with Ritter's current credibility, but this should be enough.