OK.

A weighty tome entitled, rather frivolously, "Legends, Lies & Cherished Myths of World History", by Richard Shenkman, author of "Legends, Lies & Cherished Mythis of American History".

Published by Harper Collins.

P 234 "Besides, as the British military warned Neville Chamberlain, the empire had too many enemies. In 1937 the British chiefs of staff concluded: "We cannot safeguard our territory, trade and vital interests against Germany, Italy and Japan simultaneously." Given this situation, what the British sensibly tried to do was reduce the number of potential enemies they faced by appeasing one of them.

Appeasing Germany in 1938 was not the key mistake, therefore. The mistake was allowing Germany to become so powerful earlier that Britain and France had no choice by 1938 but to adopt a policy of appeasement.

P 253 Churchill in his own history of the war never mentioned he'd approved of appeasement. I think this was good, because it wouldn't have looked so good.

But he did. At the very same time that he was publicly assuring the English that he wasnted "victory at all costs", he was privately telling the cabinet he'd consider giving Germany back some of it's African colonies and giving Italy Gibraltar, Malta, and the Suez Canal if that would get Britain "out of this jam."