And if the World Health Organization is a Bush flunky now, where else can we go with this?

I have similar reports from the European Commission:

1. On the basis of an assessment of the possible exposure from depleted uranium, taking all pathways of exposure into account, it is concluded that it could not result in a deterministic radiation detriment, except perhaps in the case of embedded DU shrapnel. The basic hypothesis of radiation protection implies that the stochastic risk exist even for low doses. However at low doses (below 100 mSv) no observable health effect compared to the base line incidence would be observed.

On the basis of available information, it is concluded that exposure to DU could not produce any detectable health effects under realistic assumptions of the doses that might be received.

Moreover, in view of the fact that committed doses from incorporated DU build up over a lifetime and in view of the minimum latency period of cancer induction, such effects could not occur during the first few years after incorporation as a result of radiological exposure.

This conclusion applies in particular to leukaemia: while the latency period for leukaemia is shorter than for solid cancers, uranium accumulates very little in blood forming organs such as bone marrow. Following inhalation of insoluble uranium the calculated risk of leukaemia is orders of magnitude lower than the risk of lung cancer induction. The possibility of a combined effect of exposure to toxic or carcinogenic chemicals and to radiation can not a priori be excluded but there is no evidence to support this hypothesis either. Under the considered scenarios, exposures to DU give low doses, comparable to natural background. Hence there is no reason to believe that chemicals may change the magnitude of the potential radiation effects.

This is from the Royal Society, and probably the most cautious paper I found:

Conclusions:

Based on our own estimates of intakes of DU, we have
drawn the following conclusions:

a. Except in extreme circumstances any extra risks of developing fatal cancers as a result of radiation from internal exposure to DU arising from battlefield conditions are likely to be undetectable above the general risk of dying from cancer over a normal lifetime. This remains true even if our estimates of risk resulting from likely exposures are one hundred times too low.

b. The extreme circumstances will apply only to a very small fraction of the soldiers in a theatre of war, for example those who survive in a vehicle struck by a DU penetrator, or those involved in cleaning up struck vehicles. In such circumstances, and assuming the most unfavourable conditions, the lifetime risk of death from lung cancer could be about twice that in the general population.

c. Any extra risks of death from leukaemia, or other cancers, as a result of exposure to DU are estimated to be substantially lower than the risks of death from lung cancer. Under all likely exposure scenarios the extra lifetime risks of fatal leukaemia are predicted to be too
small to be detectable.

d. The radiological risks from the use of DU in munitions are for the most part low, but there are uncertainties in the levels of exposure that could occur under unfavourable conditions, and for small numbers of soldiers there could be circumstances in which the excess risks of lung cancer are substantial. It is for this reason that further work should be undertaken to clarify the extent of intakes on the battlefield.

e. The estimated DU intakes for most soldiers on the battlefield are not expected to result in concentrations of DU in the kidney that exceed 0.1 microgram per gram of kidney, even transiently. Consequently, in these cases it is not expected that adverse effects on the kidney or any other organ would occur.

f. Levels of uranium in the kidney of soldiers surviving in tanks struck by DU rounds, or of soldiers working for protracted periods in heavily contaminated vehicles, could reach concentrations that lead to some shortterm kidney dysfunction, but whether this would lead to any long-term adverse effects is unclear as adequate studies of the long-term effects on the kidney of acute or protracted exposures to elevated levels of uranium are not available. According to worst-case assumptions, kidney uranium levels in some soldiers could be very high, and would probably lead to kidney failure within a few days of exposure. However, we are not aware of any cases of kidney failure, occurring within a few days of exposure, in US soldiers who would have received the highest DU intakes during the Gulf War, but we cannot rule out some kidney damage for such soldiers under worst-case assumptions.

g. For those returning to live in areas where DU munitions were deployed, including peace-keepers, the inhalation intakes from resuspended DU are considered to be unlikely to cause any substantial increase in lung cancer or any other cancers. The estimated excess lifetime risk of fatal lung cancer is about one in a million, although there could be higher risks for some individuals with worst-case intakes of DU due to higher levels of local contamination. Estimated risks of other cancers are at least 100-fold lower. There are, however, large uncertainties in the estimates of inhalation intakes in the years following a conflict.

h. No effects on kidney function from inhalation of resuspended DU are expected for most individuals who return after a conflict. Small effects on kidney function are possible using worst-case assumptions, but would at most only apply to a small number of individuals.

i. Ingestion of DU in contaminated water and food, and from soil, will be highly variable and may be significant in some cases, eg children playing in areas where DU penetrators have impacted, ingestion of heavily contaminated soil, or where a buried penetrator feeds uranium directly into a well. Environmental movement of DU from buried penetrators into local water supplies is likely to be very slow and over a period of decades levels of uranium could increase in some local water supplies.

You have anecdotes and nutball web sites. If you have any real science studies, from recognized authorities, deploy them.