In spite of the frustration and ineffectiveness we have experienced in the fight against piracy in the Western Indian Ocean, the USA has already done more than its share to solve the problem. We have several warships in the area, including an amphibious assault ship/helicopter carrier with a batallion of Marines aboard. I understand a floating base, a barge with support facilities for this squadron, is being towed into the area even now. Even so, maintaining this modest squadron in this remote place would be pretty much impossible if it wasn't already in partial support of our naval presence in the Persian Gulf.

These are dangerous waters to operate in (I doubt if they are very well charted, especially for operations close inshore). This is how Philadelphia was lost during the First Barbary War, she ran aground while chasing pirates in unfamiliar waters and was captured by them, her crew taken hostage. (Yeah, I have nightmares about that, too!).

The last mission the Navy had like this was closer to home, the interdiction of the drug trade in the Caribbean and in Central American Pacific waters. At least, in that area, we had bases, and many friendly countries around. It took us years to set up an effective narcotics interdiction system, but a lot of contraband still gets through.

The ships available for this kind of work are not too different from the frigate I served on in the Navy 40 years ago. But even though technology has changed, the general capabilities and the mission has not.

Dewey was an all-purpose destroyer leader, set up for anti-submarine and anti-aircraft defense. (Our primary mission was to defend a carrier task force from attack). We had a 5" rapid fire (40 rounds per minute, with an accurate range of 12 miles) gun mount, very effective against large surface ships and to support ground troops, but it was pretty useless for fast, low radar profile craft like the newest Russian missile boats. We relied on carrier aircraft to provide us protection from them. This gun was directed by a radar fire control system, and although it had an optical backup system, it was strictly a backup. We could barely hit a towed target a few miles away with it in practice, against a fast moving speedboat made of undetectable wood or fiberglass, it would have been useless. Modern ships have smaller guns, or none at all. They rely on missiles, also useless against pirates.

Before we left for Vietnam, we were equipped with 2 .50 caliber machine guns for dealing with small craft and an 81mm mortar to dispense chaff to confuse enemy radar. Modern ships of the same general class rely even less on gunfire and are less capable of independent operation. They are designed to operate as part of an integrated defense system against sophisticated, multi-layered threats. They are neither prepared for nor train against attacks from Zodiacs and speedboats.

Another characteristic that has changed little over the last few decades is performance. Although a small surface combatant can cross an ocean at 12 knots, at flank speed, she can go through a full load of bunker fuel in an afternoon. Keeping a half dozen of these on patrol over an area the size of Texas requires a steady stream of oilers to keep them topped up. My ship on patrol used to refuel every three days to assure we were ready at all times, and when we were reassigned from Yankee Station off the DMZ to go to the Sea of Japan for the Pueblo Crisis, we had to refuel underway frequently from the cruiser we escorted as we rushed north at flank speed . This fuel has to come from half a world away, in ships especially equipped to deliver it.

In short, it appears that even the mighty US Navy is pretty much stretched to its limits prosecuting these patrols against the pirate coast, considering its other committments. Other nations are also present, including the French, Russians, Chinese and Indians, and perhaps others, but supplying and coordinating a multinational squadron like this, even for allies on a common mission, has numerous problems of its own.