The battle at Midway started off with 4 carriers for Japan, 3 for the US. And one of our carriers, Yorktown, had been only hastily repaired from severe damage in the Battle of the Coral Sea a few months earlier. (The US also lost the fleet carrier USS Lexington at Coral Sea.)The IJN had a vast superiority in planes, even counting our land based aircraft stationed at Midway.

Japan lost all 4 biggest of her biggest carriers, (the same ones that had attacked Pearl Harbor a few months earlier) and all their skilled pilots and their planes. It was their primary strike force.

The US lost one carrier, Yorktown, at Midway The US did lose a lot of planes and pilots, but with our industrial power, were quickly replaced. In fact, planes, pilots and ships were already being prepared for war even as the battle was being fought.

Japan never was able to catch up, after Midway, she knew that the Pearl Harbor raid would only leave her a window of a year or so before America's industrial power surpassed her. Japan was on the defensive immediately after the battle, so it was indeed a strategic victory for us. But with a 4-3 advantage in fleet carriers at the start converted to a 0-2 shortfall, it was also a tactical disaster for the Japanese. I'm sure their naval Leadership was well aware of that. Or should have been.

But be that as it may, reading that IJN action report tells us today that they were doing their best to psychologically minimize the scale and impact of the loss, if not to their political leadership, then to to themselves.

The characterization of tactical defeat/strategic victory could be applied to the Battle of the Coral Sea, a few months earlier. The two opponents were of roughly equal strength, and we sustained heavier losses than the Japanese, but the Japanese advance in the Western Pacific was stopped, buying the Allies time.

The time between Pearl Harbor and Midway must have been been one of dread and despair for those Americans who actually knew the situation in the Pacific. It was our finest hour.