There are number of unanswered questions if that article is correct.

Among them.
Where did the order originate?
Who authorised it?

The obvious impact of air strikes accounts for a great deal of why the Iraqi Army fell apart. But not all of it. While they had inferior arms they had superior position. They could have inflicted massive casualties on Coalition forces, at the cost of massive losses to themselves true. But from what I’ve been seeing in interviews they had enough Iraqi Forces who were willing to stand and fight, even knowing the outcome. The constant discovery of weapons caches in the aftermath tells me they had more than enough armament to make advances by Coalitions forces a very expensive proposition, in men and material. If they had taken hardened defensive positions in the cities, we'd still be on the outskirts of Baghdad.

I took the CENTCOM assessment of the collapse of the CNC structure with a few grains of salt. With modern equipment the destruction of a Encrypted Mobile Radio Network is very difficult. . The field units can be as small as a cell phone, the Command Units can be as little as a small desktop radio. Add couriers and alternate means of communications? Then it gets virtually impossible The reports afterwards indicate a large number of the High Command survived the war. While many were demoralized, just as many would have fought if so ordered.

I am aware of the Intel assessments that if Saddam were gone the army would collapse due to his habit of top-down control with individual initiative being punished. From the interviews I’ve been seeing many of the higher command officers would have fought their units simply because their country was being invaded. Yet, they didn't.

There is more to this than meets the eye, I smell a very high participation from Psy-Ops and quite possibly a little fake and dodge from Spec Ops. Like phone calls, emails and text messages from someone who wasn’t who they said they were.
The more I see the more I feel there was an awful lot of subsurface activities we’ll most likely never know.