U.N. Weapons hunter scoffs at enrichment components found in Iraq.

I have two problems with his conclusions: first, his dismissal of the parts found is valid only if this particular cache happened to be the only one in the entire nation of Iraq. Unless he is psychic, I'm not sure he can make that statement with any accuracy.

Second, he seems to have great confidence that Saddam would not have been able to pull the wool over the eyes of U.N. inspectors.

But the past history of U.N. inspection efforts seems to say otherwise:

The IAEA performance in Iraq has not been reassuring. Iraq learned early on that it could conceal a nuclear weapons program by cooperating with the IAEA. Khidhir Hamza, a senior Iraqi scientist who defected to the United States in 1994, wrote in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that Saddam Hussein approved a deception-by-cooperation scheme in 1974.

"Iraq was careful to avoid raising IAEA suspicions; an elaborate strategy was gradually developed to deceive and manipulate the agency," Hamza said.[6] The strategy worked.

Iraq, as a signer of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, was subject to IAEA inspections on all nuclear facilities. But IAEA's inspectors had failed to detect the Iraqi "Manhattan Project," which was discovered after the Gulf War by IAEA teams at sites identified by the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM).