"If the current Kay exit interview had been available in March 2003, it's unlikely that the administration would have pressed for war. But since the war case rested on multiple pillars -- dealing with a problem now before it became an unmanageable problem later, recognizing that Hussein could not be trusted in the long run, recognizing that the war on terrorists involved getting tough on the causes of terrorism (stunted political development in the Middle East), recognizing that the status quo policy on Iraq was responsible for creating the conditions that gave rise to al Qaeda in the first place -- it is possible that reasonable people would have still advocated war. "

I would advocate for war. Actually, I would advocate that Saddam be threatened with a miltary force that could remove him from power, if he did not comply with his cease fire agreement. And if Saddam still did not comply, then to use that force to remove him from power. I view the WMD clause in the cease fire agreement, as a minor confident building step towards fulfilling the cease fire agreement. The main part of cease fire agreement was reparation to Kuwait. And the purpose of the reparation to Kuwait, wasn't to punish Iraq, but to clearly show that the invasion of Kuwait was not "profitable idea". It's sort of like a person stealing someone's bike, and that person is required to return the bike and paid for any damages done to that bike.
Another aspect of this war involving Kuwait was the role of the Saudis and other Arab countries. They didn't want us pushing Iraq to a complete surrender (something the US would have preferred to do, if we are going to involve ourselves in a miltary conflict). I would say that the arab countries strongly persuaded us (and paying billions of dollars for the coalition miltary cost is certainly a convincing argument:) to just push Saddam out of Kuwait, then try to get a reasonable cease fire agreement. And think that after a decade of Saddam not willing to fulfill his commitents, most Arab countries have reach the opinion that a regime change was the only workable solution. Therefore, the idea of first threatening then if this failed, engaging in a miltary action which would result in ending Saddam's regime, first required that the Saudis and other Arab countries to be on board.