I see a couple potential sticking points:

* An RLV flight crewmember who exercises control authority over the vehicle must possess an FAA pilot certificate and hold ratings in aircraft of comparable category, class, and type.

What category and class would that be, "Single engine rocket?" Actually, looking at the SpaceShipOne, I suppose it would be "Single Engine Land" plane with perhaps a glider rating thrown in for good measure. A "high performace" signoff would probably apply, too.

* RLV flight crewmembers must possess a valid FAA 2nd Class medical certificate, similar to that required for pilots of non-airline commercial aircraft.

This isn't a big deal. I have a 2nd Class medical. It isn't very restrictive except for things like diabetis (and even that might have an exception), seizures, heart disease, and the use of medications that can cause the droops. Oh, you can't have a DUI conviction.

* The crew must be trained with a mission- and configuration-specific training program for flight crew developed by the RLV operator.

This isn't a bad idea. Learning on the job in a supersonic aircraft has a high mortality rate. That's why guys like Chuck Yeager and Scott Crossfield are test pilot legends - they did it and lived.

* The RLV operator must regulate the atmospheric conditions for all crewed areas, including oxygen/carbon dioxide management, cabin pressure, and temperature. A backup oxygen supply also must be present.

Actually, this one might cause trouble for SpaceShipOne. If I remember correctly, SpaceShipOne pilots don't wear pressure suits. Simply having a backup oxygen supply isn't good enough if you're above about 40,000 feet altitude. You need pressure on your body such as that provided by a pressure suit or a pressurized cabin. SpaceShipOne's approach to pressurization is typically Rutan-super simple - they seal it before takeoff and use CO2 scrubbers.

* Fire detection and suppression equipment must be present.

Not much wrong with this one.

* Human factors engineering must be applied to the design of all human-machine interfaces, such as displays and controls. DOD and NASA human factors documentation can be used as guidance.

Actually, this one could be the most problematic due to the subjective nature of the subject. There are certainly good and bad practices when it comes to human-machine interfaces, but this one might be pretty vague to enforce.*

If the day comes when space tourism becomes a reality, then regulation will likely be much more rigorous. It currently costs millions of dollars to certify a simple private airplane design to carry passengers. If they try to hold space tourism vehicles to the same standards as airplanes, then certification costs will be very high. For example, using SpaceShipOne as an example, you'd not only have to certify the SSO vehicle itself, you'd have to certify the Viking mothership, the custom avionics, the rocket engine, and perhaps even the engines on the Viking. From what I remember, the Viking uses engines from the T-38 Talon trainer. While the core engines do have a certified version, I'm pretty sure the afterburner version never went through civilian certification. Just as a guess, I'd put the full certification costs at well over $100 million.

* Back in 1991, I was managing issues related to the Cobra Dane System Modernization program. One of Raytheon's biggest concerns was the part of the contract dealing with the user interface. In the past, that had proven to be a huge problem for contractors because getting the customer to agree on the interface was so difficult. We (several Air Force representatives, 2 of us with Cobra Dane experience) hit upon an idea: prove the interface had the data elements necessary to accomplish the Dane's missions and handle differences with the old user interface as a training issue. We took copies of all Cobra Dane checklists with us to Raytheon and went through them line by line, verifying that the data elements were present. Doing this, we found one critical element that Raytheon had missed but other than that, we were able to reach agreement on the interface in just a few hours. Raytheon was very pleased with the outcome because we removed the ambiguity from the user interface design effort.