In point of fact, there was absolutely nothing new in this memo...to indicate that airplanes would be hijacked and plowed into buildings.

I'll certainly concede that security officials had long been aware of the threat from skyjacked jetliners, but that specific language wasn't in the Aug 6 PDB.

Nevertheless, we know that in the wake of 9/11, NSA Dr. Condi Rice was trying hard to disavow any awareness that hijacked aircraft might be used as weapons. Subsequently however, and prior to her public testimony before the 911 Commission, she quietly approached commissioners and conceded that she had been wrong on this point.

Given Dr. Rice's tardy acknowledgment of the hijacked airliner threat, and taken in concert with the Aug 6 PDB, and other even more specific information available to intelligence and security officials in the summer of 2001, and before, it is difficult to imagine how the terrorists were able to succeed in their terrible mission.

Under normal circumstances, security and intelligence officials consider which weapons might be available to a potential enemy, and gear their defensive preparations accordingly. Security arrangements at the 2001 Genoa G8 summit are a good example.

In the days leading up to Sept. 11, 2001, we knew terrorists wanted to attack us, and we knew the kinds of weapons they might use. In light of this intelligence, our defense officials' claim that they were "blindsided" seem a bit disengenuous, irrespective of what was or wasn't contained in the Aug 6 PDB.

S