388. In the period immediately following hostilities, there was much disorder and looting in Iraq.

Coalition activities were initially directed to mopping up outlying resistance, establishing internal security and repairing public utilities. Although the 75th Exploitation Task Force was set up to find and destroy chemical or biological weapons deployed on the battlefield or stockpiled in position near Iraqi military units, circumstances on the ground made their operations very difficult.

389. During this period, much potential evidence about prohibited Iraqi weapons programmes may have been destroyed. The systematic destruction of computers and other forms of records at some sites suggested that it was not the work of looters but was part of a scheme of orchestrated destruction. There was also evidence of sanitisation of sites which may have been used for research.

390. Iraqi concealment activities may also have hidden evidence from Coalition forces. Items were buried. A complete fighter aircraft was, for example, dug out of the sand by US Air Force troops after the end of military action. It would not have been difficult to conceal in this way a complete Al Hussein missile. It would have been even easier to conceal such missiles if they were broken down into components, as some intelligence suggested.

391. We were told that the volume of biological and chemical agents unaccounted for at the time of UNSCOM’s departure, even if they were all held together, would fit into a petrol tanker. If they were dispersed and hidden in small quantities, they would be even harder to discover; and they could be concealed in containers bearing an innocent description which would not raise suspicion if they were standing in the open.

392. We conclude that it would be a rash person who asserted at this stage that evidence of Iraqi possession of stocks of biological or chemical agents, or even of banned missiles, does not exist or will never be found.

393. In June 2003, the US-led Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was established to investigate ‘weapons of mass destruction developed by Iraq under the previous regime’ and took over from the 75th Exploitation Task Force.

394. Following initial investigations, the ISG noted that it was unlikely that the Iraqis had deployed chemical and biological weapons on the battlefield for use. In March 2004, the ISG published an interim “Status Report” in which it projected key priorities for future investigation, including:

a. Further research into a complex and well-developed procurement system hidden by an effective denial and deception strategy.

b. New leads on plans to develop an indigenous capability to produce a range of chemicals, some of them subject to sanctions.

c. New information related to potential dual-use facilities.

d. Information indicating Iraqi interest in maintaining the knowledge needed to support a potential nuclear programme.

395. As we note in the introduction to this report, the ISG have not yet produced any publicly available comprehensive report. But we have been advised that, in their work over the past year, they have developed the following key concerns:

a. On Iraq’s nuclear programme, the ISG are continuing to investigate Iraqi attempts to sustain the necessary intellectual capital, both human and documentary, to reconstitute such a programme.

b. On Iraq’s chemical weapons programme, the ISG found a small number of pre-1991 weapons.

c. On Iraq’s biological weapons programme, the ISG are continuing to investigate the evidence of post-1991 biological research, including potential laboratories run by the Iraqi Intelligence Service.

d. On Iraq’s ballistic missile programme, there is evidence of clear decisions by the Iraqi leadership to proceed with the development and production of ballistic missiles beyond permitted ranges, but no corroboration that new warheads capable of chemical and biological payloads were developed for ballistic missiles.

396. The ISG are continuing to investigate the decisions and plans of the former Iraqi regime, and we have been told that the debriefing of detainees has included:

a. Admissions that chemical weapons were used in the Iran-Iraq war, but assertions that any remaining stocks were destroyed in 1991.

b. Statements that after 1991 the Iraqi regime was determined to maintain the intellectual capital necessary for reconstruction of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programmes once sanctions were significantly eroded or lifted.

CONCLUSIONS

397. For the reasons given above, even now it is premature to reach conclusions about Iraq’s prohibited weapons. But from the evidence which has been found and de-briefing of Iraqi personnel it appears that prior to the war the Iraqi regime:

a. Had the strategic intention of resuming the pursuit of prohibited weapons programmes, including if possible its nuclear weapons programme, when United Nations inspection regimes were relaxed and sanctions were eroded or lifted.

b. In support of that goal, was carrying out illicit research and development, and procurement, activities.

c. Was developing ballistic missiles with a range longer than permitted under relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.

d. Did not, however, have significant - if any - stocks of chemical or biological weapons in a state fit for deployment, or developed plans for using them.