according to this article by Ralph Peters, a 20 year intel officer.

With few exceptions, high-level intelligence managers are extremely cautious. That's how they reached their rarified positions. They aren't about to risk their reputations on some hot-potato hypothesis proposed by a staffer who knows how al Qaeda works, but not how congressional sub-committees function. Wise subordinates take their cue: Their goal is to appease the boss, not to open his eyes.

A past example: Prior to 9/11, making too much noise about "Islamic" threats just painted you as a "loose cannon," even a bigot. Even now, any mention of Islam as a causative factor has to be qualified with gushing remarks praising the religion in general. If intelligence officers cannot speak frankly, we will always lag behind our less-scrupulous enemies. And Americans will die. Because the truth is uncomfortable.

Changing chiefs is inadequate. You've got to change the culture of the Indians.

It's a good article. He points out how the call for an "Intel Czar":

If this or the next administration heeds the advice of the 9/11 Commission, we'll see an intelligence czar in the president's cabinet. While this may do no harm — as long as it doesn't further stifle dissenting opinions — it's like trying to save the horse-and-buggy trade by adding another boss to the livery stable.

His comments, supported by similar opinions I've heard from Intel people, strongly suggest that the problems in the Intel Community go far deeper than merely adding more bureaucracy on top of the current bureaucracy.