I suppose it's hopeless to try and go over all this yet again. You've fixated on stockpiles like a chicken on a horizontal line, and I guess that's where it's going to stay.

What do you suppose has changed since Kay's first report? His conclusions then:

1. Saddam, at least as judged by those scientists and other insiders who worked in his military-industrial programs, had not given up his aspirations and intentions to continue to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Even those senior officials we have interviewed who claim no direct knowledge of any on-going prohibited activities readily acknowledge that Saddam intended to resume these programs whenever the external restrictions were removed. Several of these officials acknowledge receiving inquiries since 2000 from Saddam or his sons about how long it would take to either restart CW production or make available chemical weapons.

2. In the delivery systems area there were already well advanced, but undeclared, on-going activities that, if OIF had not intervened, would have resulted in the production of missiles with ranges at least up to 1000 km, well in excess of the UN permitted range of 150 km. These missile activities were supported by a serious clandestine procurement program about which we have much still to learn.

3. In the chemical and biological weapons area we have confidence that there were at a minimum clandestine on-going research and development activities that were embedded in the Iraqi Intelligence Service. While we have much yet to learn about the exact work programs and capabilities of these activities, it is already apparent that these undeclared activities would have at a minimum facilitated chemical and biological weapons activities and provided a technically trained cadre.

Or since Duelfer's most recent report?

The budget of MIC increased nearly 100 fold from 1996 to 2003, with the budget totaling $500 million in 2003. Most of this money came from illicit oil contracts. Iraq imported banned military weapons and technology and dual-use goods through Oil for Food contracts. Companies in several countries were involved in these efforts. Direct roles by government officials are also clearly established.

...Much is known about Iraq’s various efforts to conceal WMD from UNSCOM after the Gulf War in 1991. The ISG, however, has uncovered more details about the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq against UNSCOM and later UNMOVIC. Moreover, these efforts at deception did not end with the departure of inspectors in 1998, and indeed deception continued right up until war in 2003.

The Iraqi Intelligence Service was tasked with monitoring and infiltrating UNSCOM and UNMOVIC. Iraqi officials tell us hundreds of officers from multiple directorates were tasked to monitor the UN officials, employing a spectrum of capabilities from human to electronic surveillance. Elaborate plans were developed and rehearsed to enable sensitive sites to be able to hide sensitive documents and equipment on as little as 15 minutes notice. Iraqi intelligence engaged in a worldwide effort to collect intelligence on the UN, including efforts to recruit sources inside the UN, UNSCOM and UNMOVIC.

This was the wonderful inspection process that was going to save us all, remember?

The ISG has developed new information regarding Iraq’s dual-use facilities and ongoing research suitable for a capability to produce biological or chemical agents on short notice. Iraq did have facilities suitable for the production of biological and chemical agents needed for weapons. It had plans to improve and expand and even build new facilities.

...Likewise, in the nuclear arena, the ISG has developed information that suggests Iraqi interest in preserving and expanding the knowledge needed to design and develop nuclear weapons.

One significant effort illustrating this was a high-speed rail gun program under the direction of two senior scientists associated with Iraq’s pre-1991 nuclear weapons program. Documents from this project show that the scientists were developing a rail gun designed to achieve speeds of 2-10 kilometers per second. The ostensible purpose for this research was development of an air defense gun, but these speeds are what are necessary to conduct experiments of metals compressing together at high speed as they do in a nuclear detonation. Scientists refer to these experiments as “equation of state” measurements.

Not only were these scientists developing a rail gun, but their laboratory also contained documents describing diagnostic techniques that are important for nuclear weapons experiments, such as flash x-ray radiography, laser velocimetry, and high-speed photography. Other documents found outside the laboratory described a high-voltage switch that can be used to detonate a nuclear weapon, laser detonation, nuclear fusion, radiation measurement, and radiation safety. These fields are certainly not related to air defense.

It is this combination of topics that makes us suspect this lab was intentionally focused on research applicable for nuclear weapons development.

You can read the rest if you want. Is this enough smoke to deduce the existence of a fire? Maybe not yet, but it's a hell of a lot of smoke for a regime that you insist had no WMD ambitions at all. One senator complained that the full classified report was more undecisive. Maybe he's right--I haven't seen it.

More smoke:

- There was a detailed and organized destruction of massive amounts of records at possible WMD facilities. Some after the war. Why?

- There were hundreds of weapons scientists on Saddam's payroll at the time of the invasion. Why?

- A number of these scientists have been targeted for death. Some have been killed, even after the war. Why?

- Lines of trucks poured out of Iraq into Syria. Why?

- Saddam Hussein had a long history of developing, deploying, and using WMD. He began a nuclear weapons program that was destroyed by Israel. He began a second, less centralized one, which remained concealed from the United Nations until it was exposed after the Gulf War. Some people might call this a pattern of behavior.

- The Butler Report says it was "credible" that Saddam was looking for a new supply of partially-refined uranium in Africa, his supply in Iraq being under U.N. lock and key. Why? All parties agree Iraq did have a trade mission down there. If Iraq wasn't shopping for uranium, what was it looking for? With Iraq under close observation, what could he have done with it? Were third parties involved?

I don't know how to explain analytical thinking to you. If there's an elephant in the living room, it doesn't answer all the questions that need to be answered if you simply point out that it isn't a giraffe.

I know one thing for certain. Whatever his plans were for when the U.N. finally fizzled out, Saddam sure as hell isn't going to be doing anything now. That works for me.

If I'm not looking at the same line drawn on the ground that you are, sorry.

"Some circumstantial evidence is very strong, as when you find a trout in the milk."

--Henry David Thoreau