From the opinion:

Typically a party asserting compliance with a court decision ordering remedial action bears the burden of establishing that compliance, and our April 15 order made the allocation of that burden clear in this case. See also DeRolph v. State, 83 Ohio St. 3d 1212, 1212, 699 N.E.2d 518 (1998) (state must meet burden by preponderance of evidence standard).

We also reject the State's related argument that the doctrine of separation of powers limits our review to the issue of whether the legislature had the authority to pass such legislation. Any language in U.S.D. No. 229 v. State, 256 Kan. 232, 236-38, 885 P.2d 1170 (1994), to this effect is inapplicable here because of this case's remedial posture. Even now, however, we do not quarrel with the legislature's authority. We simply recognize that the final decision as to the constitutionality of legislation rests exclusively with the courts. Although the balance of power may be delicate, ever since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803), it has been settled that the judiciary's sworn duty includes judicial review of legislation for constitutional infirmity. We are not at liberty to abdicate our own constitutional duty.

Again, like arguments have been raised in other state courts. Other state courts consistently reaffirm their authority, indeed their duty, to engage in judicial review and, when necessary, compel the legislative and executive branches to conform their actions to that which the constitution requires.

This is followed in the text by two examples (Arkansas and Kentucky) -- omitted here, but worth reading.

Almost 60 years ago the Kansas Supreme Court addressed the separation of powers issue in the non-school finance case of Berentz v. Comm'rs of Coffeyville, 159 Kan. 58, 152 P.2d 53 (1944). There the appellants challenged a pension act on the grounds it violated Article 2, § 17 of the Kansas Constitution. Finding the challenge meritorious, this court noted:

"[T]his court has always approached consideration of questions challenging the constitutionality of statutes with a disposition to determine them in such manner as to sustain the validity of the enactment in question. It has repeatedly recognized, as we do now, the rule that it is the duty of the court to uphold a law whenever such action is possible. In so doing it has not, however, lost sight of the fact that constitutions are the work not of legislatures or of courts, but of the people, and when in its calm and deliberate judgment, free from the influences frequently responsible for legislative enactments, it determines rights guaranteed by its provisions have been encroached upon it has, with equal consistency, recognized its duty and obligation to declare those enactments in contravention of constitutional provisions." (Emphasis added.) 159 Kan. at 62-63.

Our holding in Berentz is consistent with decisions in other states when a challenge has been made to the constitutionality of school finance systems and a separation of powers issue has arisen during the remedial phase. We agree with the conclusions drawn by one commentator reviewing those cases:

"[J]udicial monitoring in the remedial phase can help check political process defects and ensure that meaningful relief effectuates the court's decision.

"Thus, when these defects lead to a continued constitutional violation, judicial action is entirely consistent with separation of powers principles and the judicial role. Although state constitutions may commit educational matters to the legislative and executive branches, if these branches fail to fulfill such duties in a constitutional manner, 'the Court too must accept its continuing constitutional responsibility . . . for overview . . . of compliance with the constitutional imperative.' Moreover, unlike federal courts, state courts need not be constrained by federalism issues of comity or state sovereignty when exercising remedial power over a state legislature, for state courts operate within the system of a single sovereign.

"Nor should doubts about the court's equitable power to spur legislative action or to reject deficient legislation impede judicious over-sight. An active judicial role in monitoring remedy formulation is well-rooted in the courts' equitable powers. As long as such power is exercised only after legislative noncompliance, it is entirely appropriate." (Emphasis added.) Note, "Unfulfilled Promise: School Finance Remedies and State Courts," 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1072, 1087-88 (1991).

[Note: the "emphasis added" within the quotes was by the Kansas Supreme Court]