Talk to the Democrats who wrote that paper. The words "lie" and "lies" don't appear anywhere in it, and the word "lied" appears once, in a statement referring to Iraq. If Waxman's crew didn't think they could get away with the word "lie," I doubt it would stand up too many other places. After all, the Left spent most of 2004 trying to make that word stick.

Read your quote from the report again. It doesn't say what you think it does, unless you think Bush and Cheney wrote their own PDBs and SEIBs.

The whole thing:

Overemphasis on and underperformance in daily intelligence products.

As problematic as the October 2002 NIE was, it was not the Community’s biggest analytic failure on Iraq. Even more misleading was the river of intelligence that flowed from the CIA to top policymakers over long periods of time—in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) and in its more widely distributed companion, the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB). These daily reports were, if anything, more alarmist and less nuanced than the NIE. It was not that the intelligence was markedly different. Rather, it was that the PDBs and SEIBs, with their attention-grabbing headlines and drumbeat of repetition, left an impression of many corroborating reports where in fact there were very few sources. And in other instances, intelligence suggesting the existence of weapons programs was conveyed to senior policymakers, but later snformation casting doubt upon the validity of that intelligence was not. In ways both subtle and not so subtle, the daily reports seemed to be “selling” intelligence—in order to keep its customers, or at least the First Customer, interested.

Another quote:

We conclude that the Intelligence Community was dead wrong in almost all of its pre-war judgments about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. This was a major intelligence failure. Its principal causes were the Intelligence Community's inability to collect good information about Iraq's WMD programs, serious errors in analyzing what information it could gather, and a failure to make clear just how much of its analysis was based on assumptions, rather than good evidence. On a matter of this importance, we simply cannot afford failures of this magnitude.

After a thorough review, the Commission found no indication that the Intelligence Community distorted the evidence regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. What the intelligence professionals told you about Saddam Hussein's programs was what they believed. They were simply wrong.

As far as "misleading statements" go, I'd like to see a similar analysis of the statements of a typical Democratic politician on issues like health care, homeland security, immigration, or many other critical issues.