Most of your assumptions can't be supported.

Here's are excerpts from the paper "DETERMINATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF WWII STRATEGIC BOMBING STRATEGY," by Colonel T. Tracey Goetz, USAF:

US bombing effectiveness was disappointing due to ineffectual bomb loads and fighter
attacks. [...] German
fighters were exacting heavy losses and disrupting bomb runs. Losses sustained in two attacks
on Schweinfurt ball-bearing plants had far-reaching implications on tactics [...]
UK attacks on cities continued with increasing ferocity. The 3-night attack of Hamburg
was noteworthy in that it destroyed 33% of the houses and killed an estimated 60,000 – 100,000
people. This brought serious concern to German officials; even Hitler thought further attacks of
similar weight might end the war. The RAF proceeded to destroy one major urban center after
another.67

The British weren't "reduced to a second hand role bombing at night." Such an interpretation is at odds with the facts. They chose to operate at night because they'd earlier encountered the same daylight loss rate as did the Americans.

And as for "daylight precision bombing," there was no such thing in WW2. Even with daylight, American bombs commonly dropped miles from their target, sometimes hundreds of miles. The British were taking a different and ultimately more effective approach.