My own military service in the Vietnam era convinced me that the officer corps was more interested in their careers than with their duty. It was a sentiment I shared with many fellow veterans. When the first Gulf War broke out, I feared a disaster as I thought of those men leading Americans into combat once again. But I was mistaken.

The professionalism, skill and courage of the American military half a world away against an intact and seasoned Iraqi army defending its own country astonished me, and made me proud. What I hadn't realized was that those officers who chose to stay in the military after Vietnam, the Ensigns and Second Lieutenants, were determined to reform the military, and they did; today, these men and their proteges and students are the senior officer levels of the armed forces. When we went to war again we had the best fighting force the world had ever seen, and a political leadership that provided them with the conditions they needed for victory.

These men are now preparing to retire, but the junior officers they trained and inspired are working their way up the ranks and they are supported by noncoms and lower ranks of highly professional volunteers. On the field of battle, they are invincible, but they have been betrayed by a failed political leadership, not just by being given an impossible task without the resources to do it, but by asking these men to take up the slack by harsh, repetitive redeployments which have exhausted and demoralized them. Dr Brin brings up other themes too, the arrogant belittling and dismissive treatment of the counsel of senior warriors. And yes, the seeding of the cadet officer corps with religious zealots (as well as the military chaplain corps, which Brin does not mention) can only be interpreted as a means of ideologically indoctrinating an entire future generation of soldiers and sailors. This is disgraceful and intolerable.

Yes, I read Mr Card's essay too. And I find little to disagree with his observations, although I find his conclusions share the same error with others who continue to support the current administration's policies in the Middle East. The issue is not so much whether or not the White House plan was wrong. Their error is that they have botched it so badly that the plan is now untenable. Not only has the administration proven that it is incapable of implementing its own solutions in the mideast, it has poisoned the situation so badly that it's doubtful anyone can.