Look, I don't have the bandwidth to try and completely bring your little internal world of reality into congruence with what's going on in Iraq right now. Suffice it to say that terrorists and insurgents do not exactly wear badges when they "go to the store." U.S. and Iraq forces have uniforms.

That terrorists in civilian clothes with no other identification can move freely about is hardly surprising.

If the insurgency is so damn confident, let them identify themselves in public, and then move around. Even when no U.S. forces are in the area.

The average Iraqi is both angry with, and terrified of, these people, who have killed many, many times the Iraqis that the Coalition ever has. The insurgency and al Qaeda are targeting almost exclusively Iraqi civilians, with bombs in marketplaces, mosques, and elsewhere. Local leaders are kidnapped, threatened, and beheaded, and families of those who try to join the Army or police are attacked.

Following is an extract on Mao's policies from Petraeus' handbook. You will notice that none of this matches what the Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda are currently doing in Iraq, even phase one. They are simply killing Iraqi civilians in random, brutal attacks.

Hezbollah is following Mao's prescription far more closely than the Iraqi insurgents are.

1-31. Mao’s Theory of Protracted War outlines a three-phased, politico-military approach:

􀁺 Strategic defensive, when the government has a stronger correlation of forces and insurgents must concentrate on survival and building support.

􀁺 Strategic stalemate, when force correlations approach equilibrium and guerrilla warfare becomes the most important activity.

􀁺 Strategic counteroffensive, when insurgents have superior strength and military forces move to conventional operations to destroy the government’s military capability.

1-32. Phase I, strategic defensive, is a period of latent insurgency that allows time to wear down superior enemy strength while the insurgency gains support and establishes bases. During this phase, insurgent leaders develop the movement into an effective clandestine organization. Insurgents use a variety of subversive techniques to psychologically prepare the populace to resist the government or occupying power.

These techniques may include propaganda, demonstrations, boycotts, and sabotage. In addition, movement leaders organize or develop cooperative relationships with legitimate political action groups, youth groups, trade unions, and other front organizations. Doing this develops popular support for later political and military activities. Throughout this phase, the movement leadership—

􀁺 Recruits, organizes, and trains cadre members.
􀁺 Infiltrates key government organizations and civilian groups.
􀁺 Establishes cellular intelligence, operations, and support networks.
􀁺 Solicits and obtains funds.
􀁺 Develops sources for external support.

Subversive activities are frequently executed in an organized pattern, but major combat is avoided. The primary military activity is terrorist strikes. These are executed to gain popular support, influence recalcitrant individuals, and sap enemy strength. In the advanced stages of this phase, the insurgent organization may establish a counterstate that parallels the established authority. (A counterstate [or shadow government] is a competing structure that a movement sets up to replace the government. It includes the administrative and bureaucratic trappings of political power and performs the normal functions of a government.)

1-33. Phase II, strategic stalemate, begins with overt guerrilla warfare as the correlation of forces approaches equilibrium. In a rural-based insurgency, guerrillas normally operate from a relatively secure base area in insurgent-controlled territory. In an urban-based insurgency, guerrillas operate clandestinely, using a cellular organization. In the political arena, the movement concentrates on undermining the people’s support of the government and further expanding areas of control. Subversive activities can take the form of clandestine radio broadcasts, newspapers, and pamphlets that openly challenge the control and legitimacy of the established authority. As the populace loses faith in the established authority the people may decide to actively resist it. During this phase, a counterstate may begin to emerge to fill gaps in governance that the host-nation (HN) government is unwilling or unable to address. Two recent examples are Moqtada al Sadr’s organization in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Sadr’s Mahdi Army provides security and some services in parts of southern Iraq and Baghdad under Sadr’s control. (In fact, the Mahdi Army created gaps by undermining security and services; then it moved to solve the problem it created.) Hezbollah provides essential services and reconstruction assistance for its constituents as well as security. Each is an expression of Shiite identity against governments that are pluralist and relatively weak.

1-34. Phase III, strategic counteroffensive, occurs as the insurgent organization becomes stronger than the established authority. Insurgent forces transition from guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare. Military forces aim to destroy the enemy’s military capability. Political actions aim to completely displace all government authorities. If successful, this phase causes the government’s collapse or the occupying power’s withdrawal. Without direct foreign intervention, a strategic offensive takes on the characteristics of a full-scale civil war. As it gains control of portions of the country, the insurgent movement becomes responsible for the population, resources, and territory under its control. To consolidate and preserve its gains, an effective insurgent movement continues the phase I activities listed in paragraph 1-32. In addition it—

􀁺 Establishes an effective civil administration.
􀁺 Establishes an effective military organization.
􀁺 Provides balanced social and economic development.
􀁺 Mobilizes the populace to support the insurgent organization.
􀁺 Protects the populace from hostile actions.

1-35. Effectively applying Maoist strategy does not require a sequential or complete application of all three stages. The aim is seizing political power; if the government’s will and capability collapse early in the process, so much the better. If unsuccessful in a later phase, the insurgency might revert to an earlier one. Later insurgents added new twists to this strategy, to include rejecting the need to eventually switch to large-scale conventional operations. For example, the Algerian insurgents did not achieve much military success of any kind; instead they garnered decisive popular support through superior organizational skills and astute propaganda that exploited French mistakes. These and other factors, including the loss of will in France, compelled the French to withdraw.

Part of the amusement of arguing with you is your utter immunity to outside information, but sometimes it gets old.