Case Histories in Business Ethics
It's a document which won't allow copying text, but the link should go straight to page 118.
"The NASA figures were, in Feynman's words, exaggerated to 'the point of fantasy', and were part of a dynamic which led to a reversal of the usual view of safety."
Would NASA and the public approve of flying a "routine mission" with a 1 in 8 chance of catastrophic failure? That rate is approaching that of the most dangerous bombing raids during WW II. I doubt it. Would they approve unmanned missions with the same rate? I suspect so.
And in snooping around for the projected failure rate prior to Challenger I noticed some folks claim the current NASA estimate paints a rosier picture than what they claim is the reality. I have to go now, could dig up the citations later.
Arf
Space/Science » in reply to The words "safe" and "shuttle" have never really belonged together
In one book, Pre-Challenger failure estimates: NASA engineers, 1-100. NASA management, 1-100,000.
The whole thread (18 posts)
- Cosmis Log eye-opener. "HOW SAFE IS THE SHUTTLE?"
- re: Cosmis Log eye-opener. "HOW SAFE IS THE SHUTTLE?"
- Let's look at the 2 failures
- re: Cosmis Log eye-opener. "HOW SAFE IS THE SHUTTLE?"
- An unmanned shuttle. (Take a deep breath, let it out, do it again.)
- not with the old electronics and wiring
- The words "safe" and "shuttle" have never really belonged together
- re: An unmanned shuttle. (Take a deep breath, let it out, do it again.)
- An unmanned shuttle. (Take a deep breath, let it out, do it again.)
- re: Cosmis Log eye-opener. "HOW SAFE IS THE SHUTTLE?"
