It's vital for the western world to get the support of the moderate Arab countries, and for this to succeed, Israel must accept a Palestinian state. Unfortunately, Sharon totally hates Arafat (this goes back at the time Sharon was a general and Begin prime minister: Begin ordered him not to hurt Arafat and Sharon never understood why). We are going straight to very uncertain times if Sharon won't accept Palestina. This is quite scary.
I more and mopre believe Israel is a creation of its time, when it was PC for western countries to have colonies.
It didn't last long.
Clausewitz had interesting ideas about war strategies. It's not the number that always counts:
His argument was not, however, that the victor would necessarily be the side with the most men, but that there was no excuse for going into combat with less than the maximum available power. "If we strip the combat of all modifications which it may undergo according to its immediate purpose and the circumstances from which it proceeds, lastly if we set aside the valour of the troops [dem Wert der Truppen] ... there remains only the bare conception of the combat ... in which we distinguish nothing but the number of the combatants. This number will therefore determine victory. Now from the number of things above deducted to get to this point, it is shown that the superiority in numbers in a battle is only one of the factors employed to produce victory; that therefore so far from having with the superiority in number obtained all, or even only the principal thing, we have perhaps got very little by it, according as the other circumstances ... happen to vary.... There remains nothing, therefore, where an absolute superiority is not attainable, but to produce a relative one at the decisive point, by making skillful use of what we have.... to regard [numerical superiority] as a necessary condition of victory would be a complete misconception of our exposition."*74
A partial reading of Clausewitz's views on surprise can be just as misleading. His bald statements that it "would be a mistake ... to regard surprise as a key element of success in war" and that "surprise has lost its usefulness today" are confusing if taken out of context, and that often seems to be the case.*75 Also controversial is his argument that surprise often favors the defense. Overall, Clausewitz actually emphasized the concept of surprise strongly, suggesting that--defined as "the desire to surprise the enemy by our plans and dispositions, especially those concerning the distribution of forces"--it "lies at the root of all operations without exception, though in widely varying degrees depending on the nature and circumstances of the operation." He clearly appreciated its psychological impact, and felt that almost the only advantage of the attacker rested in surprise
On war

Raoul