Reports I've read seem to suggest that much of the Taliban's success and subsequent popularity - if that's what you'd call it - stem from negative reaction to the excesses of this very Northern Alliance during the previous civil war in the wake of the Soviet pull-out.

After years of civil war, the Taliban were able to inject some measure of law and order into the chaos and bloodshed that was Afghanistan. For the weary, suffering, battered masses, this alone apparently was enough. Over time, there may have been growing disenchantment with the Taliban's extreme repression of all artifacts of Western Civiliazation, but some reports seem to indicate that the bombing campaign has strengthened the Taliban's position with at least some of the people.

Apparently the Northern Alliance massacred hundreds of captured fighters, among them Taliban, during previous battles for Masar i Sharif (sp?), on the northern approaches to Kabul. Add to this the fact that the Northern Alliance does not have a Pushtun component and is therefore composed of ethnic minorities, and we might begin to understand the challanging political realities which frame this quagmire, and the apparent reluctance by the USA to throw our full strength behind this faction.

As for the UN, maybe I missed it, but I don't recall hearing of a Security Council resolution on the events of 9/11 or the war on terrorism. President Bush's efforts to build a coalition to go after the terrorists have gone a long way toward countering the impressions of Washington's willingness to “go-it-alone” generated during Mr. Bush's first months in office.

I agree that restoring the deposed King may be the best chance we have of establishing some semblance of normalcy to Afghanistan, but any post-conflict coalition will have to include substantial representation from the Pushtun, especially a subset of this group which hails from Khadahar, the traditional seat of Afghan civilization and culture. This Pushtun wing will probably have to include Taliban participation on some level.

We are treading through a region that is wobbly on its feet. The Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union all have varying degrees of activity by Moslem fundamentalists and extremists, including the familiar Chechens. Ongoing concerns about this fundamentalism help explain the willingness of these nations to allow passage and staging of U.S. troops.

The volatility of the region may require a U.S. presence far into the future, and such a reality is likely to force us into some very difficult decisions indeed.

sp