What to do in Africa...an analysis
This article is quite thought-provoking. Don't know if I agree with all of it, but it's worth reading. One small excerpt:
Here's what I see as the requirements for a successful intervention that really stops the violence and allows a functioning and decent polity to emerge. All contrast dramatically with [the 20th century transnationalist mindset]:
-- Forceful, armed intervention that shoots first rather than last, at least until order is restored, TV cameras and public image abroad be damned. [Extreme care in all use of force and refusal to fire first, even in the face of danger or extreme provocation - many U.N. blue berets come back with stories of having to watch rapes, kidnappings, murders, etc. and not intervene.]
-- Heavy support via air, helicopters, armor, and artillery that gives intervenors massive fire superiority, and makes even neighbouring states hesitant to act against them. [All neighbouring states and regional bodies/players must agree, and potentially 'provocative' equipment must be left at home.]
-- Strenuous and organized efforts to kill those fomenting and organizing the violence, even if they have not directly threatened troops on the ground. Since "human shield" tactics are only to be expected in response, these either would have to be ignored or bypassed somehow. [Threats must be proven to legal standards first, or action is immoral. No action can be taken against human shield tactics if it endangers large numbers of civilians, even if that policy has the effect of encouraging such tactics in future.]
-- Non-neutrality. Actively making a judgment and taking sides against the primary perpetrators of the carnage, to the extent of crushing the Lendu and Hutus as an organized movement if necessary and reserving aid for other areas until the situation is in hand. [Neutrality between the warring parties regardless of behaviour is an article of faith. Besides, evil doesn't really exist - there are only different and equally valid narratives.]
-- Demonstrated willingness to use military assets on the ground, and more, if neighbouring states calculate that no punishment will be forthcoming for attacks on the intervention force. [That would touch off a wider war, avoidance of which trumps all other missions.]
-- Refusal to treat national borders as sacrosanct if doing so gets in the way of dealing with the problem, esp. a willingness to continue "hot pursuit" across borders and remove any sanctuaries for hostile elements. [National sovereignty is sacrosanct.]
-- Willingness to reorganized national borders if necessary in order to implement a long-term resolution. [q.v. national sovereignty; borders are sacrosanct, especially in Africa.]
The "necessary measures" above would have been completely familiar to any European colonialist of 100 or 200 years ago. As noted, every item here is also completely foreign to the U.N. mindset, and Flit is right to point that out. African states and the OAU would close ranks en masse against every single one. Such measures are, of course, equally foreign to many of the Western voices now pushing for intervention.
