There are a lot of conclusions in this paper to support the fact that the CIA did not do a very good job on Iraq intelligence in the past few years. These will be repeated endlessly in the media and elsewhere. But there are some conclusions you won't be seeing much of, and I'm going to go over a few of them here:

Conclusion 76. Human intelligence (HUMINT) gathered after the production of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), did indicate that Iraqi commanders had been authorized to use chemical weapons as noted in Secretary Powell’s speech.

This is interesting, and a little weird, given the many details in the report that conclude that there were probably no such weapons at that time. The details on this conclusion are blacked out in the main paper. I don't understand this.

Conclusion 83. The Committee did not find any evidence that Administration officials attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts to change their judgments related to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

This conclusion was released some time ago, but I hope this finally puts this particular myth to bed.

Conclusion 90. The Central Intelligence Agency’s assessment that Saddam Hussein was most likely to use his own intelligence service operatives to conduct attacks was reasonable, and turned out to be accurate.

Conclusion 91. The Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) assessment that Iraq had maintained ties to several secular Palestinian terrorist groups and with the Mujahidin e-Khalq was supported by the intelligence. The CIA was also reasonable in judging that Iraq appeared to have been reaching out to more effective terrorist groups, such as Hizballah and Hamas, and might have intended to employ such surrogates in the event of war.

Conclusion 92. The Central Intelligence Agency’s examination of contacts, training, safehaven and operational cooperation as indicators of a possible Iraq-al-Qaida relationship was a reasonable and objective approach to the question.

Conclusion 93. The Central Intelligence Agency reasonably assessed that there were likely several instances of contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida throughout the 1990s’ but that these contacts did not add up to an established formal relationship.

Conclusion 94. The Central Intelligence Agency reasonably and objectively assessed in "Iraqi Support for Terrorism" that the most problematic area of contact between Iraq and al-Oaida were the reports of training in the use of non-conventional weapons. [a large blacked-out area here that I would have liked to see]

Conclusion 95. The Central Intelligence Agency’s assessment on safehaven - that al-Qaida or associated operatives were present in Baghdad and in northeastern Iraq in an area under Kurdish control - was reasonable.

Conclusion 96. The Central Intelligence Agency’s assessment that to date there was no evidence proving Iraqi complicity or assistance in an al-Qaida attack was reasonable and objective. No additional information has emerged to suggest otherwise.

Conclusion 97. The Central Intelligence Agency’s judgment that Saddam Hussein, if sufficiently desperate, might employ terrorists with a global reach - al-Qaida - to conduct terrorist attacks in the event of war, was reasonable. No information has emerged thus far to suggest that Saddam did try to employ al-Qaida in conducting terrorist attacks.

The headlines all read, "No Iraq Connection to Al Qaeda." Obviously, they could no longer use the headline "No Iraq Links to Terrorism."