The article you posted provided some useful information to feed into something I've been wondering about.

The Administration's done a great job framing discussion of a possible terrorist attack before the election in terms of an analogy with Spain, saying none too subtly that al Qaida fears Bush more than Kerry and would therefore launch an attack before the election to try and discredit Bush. I say "none too subtly", but I haven't seen anybody really calling attention to that blatant attempt to exploit terrorism for political gain. A lot of people have swallowed that premise and are debating within the bounds that the White House set.

But you know I love to question accepted dogma. Here's what the article provided:

The message also addressed the speculation that the terrorists would try to replicate their political success in Spain by disrupting the November U.S. elections. “We are very keen that Bush does not lose the upcoming elections,” the authors write. Bush’s “idiocy and religious fanaticism” are useful, the authors contend, for they stir the Islamic world to action.

That's pretty heavy. I'm not sure how that would translate into action, though. To game it out, if there's no attack, it might be seen as undermining Bush's credibility (the Chicken Little problem), but al Qaida also risks giving Bush a chance to claim that he stopped an attack, but can't disclose any details about it. They might hope that it would be interpreted as "support" for Bush's reelection, but they can't force that view.

On the other hand, if they attack, there are two possible outcomes: They succeed, and Bush is seen as ineffective, though he'd possess a powerful fear-card to try and play ("don't change horses..." etc.); or they fail, and Bush can claim credit.

I don't know which branch of the decision-tree is correct, though I lean to the no-attack branch because it's less risky for al Qaida. I wouldn't underestimate al Qaida's understanding of American politics:

The Internet document suggested that a new intelligence was at work, a rationality not seen in Al Qaeda documents before. The Mujahideen Services Center, whatever that was, appeared to operate as a kind of Islamist think tank. “The person who put together those chapters had a clear strategic vision, realistic and well thought out,” Amirah says. He told Hegghammer, “This is political science applied to jihad.”

The action they take, or don't take, is likely to be correct in terms of their goals--so whatever happens will provide a pretty accurate insight into how al Qaida feels about Bush.

Have the stakes ever been higher in an American election?