I hear a lot about how the administration screwed up the "after the war" plans. Since the war itself went spectacularly well, it was immediately written out of the discussion. Thou shalt say nothing good about the Bush administration.

But planning wasn't the problem, and still isn't. The problem is that we have chosen to fight the first "soft" war in history.

Naturally, the first thing that comes up when criticizing the post-war issue is, what should have been done differently? Here's a few examples (not an exhaustive list):

- Don't break up the army.

Okay, so we accept the new army wholesale. How many ringers are still in there? Does the army go to work before it gets checked out? Hell, even now there's enough ringers in the new Iraqi security forces to make trouble. What would keeping them all on the job have bought us?

- Not enough troops on the ground.

Probably number one on the list. Unfortunately, the problem isn't a shortage of armed force, it's a shortage of legitimate targets. Once we decided we weren't going to shoot looters, it doesn't matter how many guys are standing around with guns. Obviously, the mere presence of heavily-armed troops does not in and of itself intimidate the insurgents and criminals.

Right now, our enemy is well aware that, unlike any previous war, we aren't going to be killing people wholesale. No carpet bombing from thousands of feet in the air. No razing of villages containing insurgents. No attacking "holy sites." In WWII, it was routine to blow steeples off churches that could have concealed snipers or spotters.

Put another ten thousand troops on the border to guard it? And when an Iranian civilian walks across the border, do you shoot him? Or any of the thousands of pilgrims who routinely take that route? Do you inspect each one personally?

- Not enough troops from other countries.

Same argument. What would it help? Unless you think it's okay for French artillery to blow up mosques. Only positive aspect: more of the people who get blown up aren't American. Is this the level we're operating at?

- Failure to repair infrastructure fast enough.

I don't know how it could be fixed any faster, especially when people are trying to wreck it. The common myth is that everything was working great until the war. This is a lie. The infrastructure was a mess, and the lack of redundancy in the systems is one reason sabotage is so effective. We long ago got it back to the point where it was, and now are trying to catch up to a rapidly-expanding Iraqi economy.

There are other planning issues brought up as well. Feel free to throw in your own and I'll try to address them.

Most of our successful victories in past wars involved the complete defeat of the enemy. Europe and Japan looked like hell when the war was done. The Germans and Japanese were beaten soundly, and knew it.

In Iraq, much of the nation wouldn't even know there had been a war if they didn't see it on television. There are no seas of rubble. I remember watching on camera the bombing at the beginning of the war, precision strikes on specific buildings. Meanwhile, lights were on in the city, traffic in the foreground moved calmly, turn signals were being used, and nobody was racing to escape. Jordan's refugee camps remained empty.

We have never fought a war like this one before--an attempt to defeat an enemy without actually hurting anyone unnecessarily.

Our enemies are bound by no rules. They use civilians as cover, fortify mosques, schools, and hospitals, use ambulances to deliver bombs, and are currently killing far more Iraqi civilians than we are. We can't eradicate them under these circumstances, and they know it.

America is hung from the yardarm for putting a leash on a prisoner. Rightfully so, perhaps, but different standards seem to be applied to the insurgents, people that Michael Moore pictures as the equivalent of American Minutemen.