In the case of the Air Force, Cheney recommended terminating both its top-of-the-line F-15 fighter and its lower-cost F-16 fighter. He cut the number of A-10 ground attack planes from 435 in 1990 to 159 in 1993, with the intention of phasing it out completely. He delayed development of the next-generation F/A-22 fighter while reducing both the annual production rate and the final production goal - steps that later led critics to claim the plane was unaffordable.

That's a lot of cutting for someone who often stressed the importance of air superiority - but he didn't stop there. After saying in congressional hearings that the military needed more air lift in the future, he recommended cutting the next-generation C-17 cargo plane from 210 to 120 airframes. And after proposing in 1990 a reduction in the B-2 bomber program from 132 planes to 75 - which he said was the minimum acceptable number - he proposed in 1992 to cease production at 20 planes.

Today, a dozen years later, many experts view these decisions with regret. The Air Force eventually decided it needed even more C-17s than the original 210, which wasted $10 billion on uneconomical production plans. Military reformers say that the United States should have bought many more B-2s for conventional bombing missions; Cheney squandered a $30 billion development program and left the Air Force with decrepit Eisenhower-era B-52s.

Other services suffered similar devastation under Cheney.

The Army lost its only tank program (Abrams), its only infantry vehicle (Bradley) and its only heavy attack helicopter (Apache). It also lost a third of its active-duty divisions, which later led to greater reliance on Reserves for combat support.

The Navy lost both of its submarine production programs (Trident and Seawolf), its top-of-the-line F-14 fighter and its next-generation A-12 bomber (which Cheney terminated so ineptly that the case is still in litigation today).

The Marine Corps, being scrappier than the other services, managed to prevent Cheney from cutting its highest-priority aviation program, the V-22 Osprey tilt rotor, by going to Congress. Cheney responded by refusing to spend the money Congress appropriated until fellow Republicans told him he was hurting the party. Today, the Pentagon points to the Osprey as a prime example of military transformation.

There were so many weapons cuts under Cheney that by election year 1992, the Pentagon could claim credit for terminating more than 100 weapons programs. Nobody knew then that B-2 bombers would play a central role in the Balkan air war or that Abrams tanks would be critical to securing Baghdad or that the military would need a system like the Osprey in Afghanistan.

Cheney was the biggest unilateral disarmer in recent history, and darnned proud of it.