The real problems began when we decided to fight a delicate war. Once it has been established that the war is a failure if anyone gets hurt, the number of troops is irrelevant.

--2,000 troops refusing to shoot looters isn't any more effective than 200 troops refusing to shoot looters.

--A car with three people in is approaching a checkpoint with 30 American soldiers manning it, and not stopping. Add another 100 American soldiers at the checkpoint. What changes?

--Is a convoy of 50 vehicles less vulnerable to IEDs than a convoy of 25?

--Would supply issues--armor, fuel, food, barracks space--be less of a problem with more troops? Would the costs be less?

--With twice as many troops in the field, would the casualties right now be lower?

--It's often said that U.S. troops are keeping Iraq from standing on its own feet. Would more of them help that?

The big mistake wasn't lack of troops. It was fighting a war where essentially the country itself was never defeated, and then assuming that democracy-minded Iraqis were going to pick up the slack almost immediately after Saddam was eliminated. No other war of occupation in our history worked like that. Not Germany, not Japan. We took over Japan and didn't give it back for seven years. And remember, it still took seven years WITHOUT Japanese insurgents undercutting things.

Who knows? Maybe we should have just gone the same route in Iraq. Taken over the country's government, set up a NATO commission or a group of generals or something to run things until things settled down, and ease the country back into democracy when the time was right. Wouldn't mind seeing someone look into that concept.