While I need to be careful given my job, suffice it to say that I have no reason to argue with those reporters and authors who claim that from captains to three-stars, Army and Marine officers are virtually unanimous in believing -- both now and in March of 2003 -- that the force was too light to ensure post-conflict stability. Maybe they are all idiots and Broz isn't, but such is how the argument breaks down.

I'll grant that throwing men at the problem isn't the solution, but there are specific problems we caused by insisting in being so "light".

On the stopping the looting, etc. The number of MP units was slashed especially hard from early CENTCOM plans. Tom is right that numbers are irrelevant if you don't take on the mission, but, part of why the military didn't is they saw that as an MP mission -- not one for regular combat troops.

Also, we did very little to secure weapons depots as we advanced on Bagdhad and for quite some time thereafter, by which point many had been looted (despite us putting yellow "do not cross tape" around them -- lawbreakers!). This was a direct response to the number of troops available being what it was. More troops would have meant more ammo dumps secured.

In general, having an overhwelming U.S. presence on the streets early on -- even if with a menacing "don't mess with us" attitude rather than "we're the Army and we're here to help" might have been useful. Much of Iraq saw little U.S. military presence for some time after the invasion, just a vaccum.

I will grant it's not fair to tar Rumsfeld with all of this. The DoD force caps meant the military could not execute every mission with the (low) level of risk it wanted. How CENTCOM prioritized after that is open to criticism. Would have have been better, long term, to devote more troops to securing ammo dumps and allowing more insecurity of our supply lines in the short run? Arguably yes. Should we have done better at having combat units cover post-conflict non-combat jobs ? Sure.

Bottom line though, is that study after study does suggest that troop density helps a LOT in stabilizing post conflict situation. There really is research on the question and the answer is clear. See recent RAND reports by Dobbins, et al, for example.