>>Depending on the accounting method used, a single shuttle mission now costs on the order of $500 million.<<

That's based on a flight rate of six per year and includes total shuttle program costs. I think the number has very limited usefulness.

>>Her proposal is to refurbish the remaining shuttle fleet by taking the vehicles offline one-by-one for a complete overhaul and rebuild, while the remaining online shuttles would operate on a reduced schedule (one flight a year).<<

That just made "per flight" costs jump to $1B.

>>Such a program, similiar to that used by the military on its aircraft/hardware, would extend the life of the remaining fleet without further compromising safety, while providing additional funds to improve quality control and restore a zero-fault atmosphere at the agency.<<

Very true - fly less, decrease accident rate - kind of unavoidable, isn't it? There's very little wrong with the quality control now, and I don't think a "zero-fault atmosphere" is attainable, certainly not with the current vehicle. All in all, I think her idea offers nothing of value.

>>a former NASA employee (a Mr. Garcia) noted that previously reliable subsystems on the shuttle were beginning to record failures, a sure sign (he said) of an ageing system that was receiving less, not more, quality control - a dangerous combination noted by many, some of whom lost their jobs because of their incessant warnings.<<

It is a sure sign of aging, not of less quality control. Inspection does not guarantee that a failure due to age will be caught. Quality control will not eliminate the failure of aging components. The only way to do that is to completely rebuild the device with new stuff, or replace it.

As for the line about workers losing their jobs over warning, that total grandstanding by this guy. We were always encouraged to voice our concerns.

-Kim-