I suggest you find someone to help you with it:

Recently:
Sewell Chan of The Washington Post again. General Kimmitt, could you tell us more specifically about what kind of background checks are done for anyone trying to join the Iraqi security forces? Like in the United States, you can type in someone's Social Security number into like the FBI's NCIC database, learn about their entire arrest record from throughout the country. Obviously, that's not possible here. But do you have, you know, a directory of former Ba'ath party members? Do you, you know, look through the computerized files of the Mukhabarat? How do you verify what someone's background is, where they're from, you know, what their occupational history is, and most importantly, whether they have a criminal record of a history of association with the former regime.

Senor: Well, we -- I don't want to -- for similar reasons I've articulated earlier, I don't want to divulge all the details on how we vet individuals. But I will say that we have within our government entities that are experienced at doing this sort of work. And I will also say that as we capture more and more senior members of the regime, as we come into possession of documents of the regime, in some cases large volumes of documents of criminal records, it helps us, and certainly Ba'ath party membership documents, documents from prisons, we are able to gather information relating to individuals that may or may not be applying for positions in the new Iraq.

Q: A very quick follow-up question. How confident would you say you are in the background and vetting process right now? Very? Somewhat? Not too confident?

Senor: I'm not going to use your adjectives to characterize it, I will use mine. And the adjective that I have been using is robust; we have a very robust process. And the fact is we have incidents, like we had this past week. They are incidents. They are isolated. They are exceptions. They are not the rule.

The fact is you do not have a situation where every other day we encounter problems with individuals within the government or the security services that turn out to be individuals who have ill intentions when they join the security services. When they happen, they are isolated incidents. We have to address them, we have to rectify them, and we do. And sometimes they are able to impose injurious results before we're able to rectify them. That's a risk in engaging in what we are doing here, engaging in the sort of work we are doing here.

But by and large, the program is working. By and large, it is that robust. And by and large, we will continue to do what we are doing. We will make adjustments as we see fit. And obviously, if the investigation that we're engaged in right now with regard the incident of this past week leads us to conclude that we do need to make adjustments, we will make those adjustments. We will communicate them to you.

But understand: by and large, this program and our vetting process overall has been quite effective.

Kimmitt: And honestly, the shortcomings that we've seen in our process is not unique to this country and, frankly, if we were to look back into our own history, not unique to the United States' history as well.

Senor: Yeah, I -- let me just follow up. We have -- as I've said earlier, we have over -- well over 150,000 Iraqis serving in security positions. And the overwhelming majority of those Iraqis have joined the security forces because they are patriotic citizens of Iraq; and they want a role in helping to rebuild this country; and they feel a great sense of pride in protecting this country against foreign elements, against the Zarqawi types who come into this country to wreak havoc, to pit one community against another Iraqi community. They have a great deal of resentment to Saddam Hussein's regime and the senior figures who are associated with it, and they want to play a major role in preventing those individuals from ever coming back to power and wreaking their own havoc here. That is the characterization I would apply to the overwhelming majority of Iraqis who are serving in the security services today.

In fact, the ratio in some recruiting centers -- for instance, in the ICDC -- is sometimes six to one in terms of the number of Iraqis who show up for which there are positions available for the jobs they're applying -- so they're -- this call to service is serious. It is real. It is something the majority of Iraqis respect. It is something that we respect. And while we have isolated incidents, as I said earlier, that is what they are; they are isolated incidents.

Kimmitt: Yeah. Particularly when -- in light of the fact that so many of the security forces are doing such a spectacular job. Over -- we have had more members of the Iraqi security services killed in the line of duty than coalition forces, and it is -- I'm sure they feel the same way we do any time one of their colleagues, any time one of their fellow IPS members go outside the line and commit these heinous acts. They understand it's a reflection not only on the person who committed it but the organization they belong to and the country they're attempting to defend.

So I would just say, for those members of the Iraqi police service that are out there every day, providing a level of support for the people of Iraq, we understand that the vast majority of you are doing an honorable job, and your country is proud of you.

Senor: Every police department -- and I know there's -- we'll just take a couple more -- but every police department in the United States has an anti-corruption division. Every police department in the United States has dedicated personnel dealing with members of their respective police departments that have ill intentions and dishonest motives and perhaps very destructive goals for what they intend to achieve as part of their own service. And unfortunately, Iraq security forces are not immune to that phenomena that you see all over the world.

(More: Coalition Provisional Authority Briefing from Iraq, with Army Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt and Dan Senor)
Friday, March 12, 2004

You're probably surprised that the Pentagon seems to already agree with lil' ol' me on the matter, right? Couldn't possibly have anything to do with the fact that they said as much last year -- could it?

On the lighter side:
* Conference on Iraqi Reconstruction, Mercatus Center, George Mason University
Remarks as delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Washington, DC, Tuesday, November 4, 2003

* Task Force 1st Armored Division Troops Combine Efforts to Hire New Police Force
BAGHDAD, Iraq, Nov. 21, 2003

Now, it's up to you, B.

Your follow-up assignment is to research your gripes before posting. I say the Pentagon realized the possibility that some of the Iraqi security force were Ba'athist supporters and would work against the Coalition Forces. You claim this is entirely out of the blue, and is likely a firm sign that Coalition trained Iraqi security forces are now turning against the Coalition Forces.

To be truthful, I did a long search over at www.defenselink.mil (as evidenced by the above posts), but could not find the direct reference. In my favor, though, I did read the article some months earlier, and had it posted it here. For your point -- um -- what have you got? A nifty little opinion? Well, I had readers at HZ reading Pentagon text, many of whom probably recall the discussion on the matter. You have -- air?

Cheers,
Dan