But first, a note to Tom: Invocation of a spectral "slippery slope" does nothing to advance discussion of the issue at hand.

Now then -- from the opinion (link in Donald's post):

Pages 6-7:

The rationale of Singer has been described as “tortured and conclusory sophistry,” and plaintiff’s argue that subsequent cases in our state make clear that Singer is no longer good law on the issue of the application of our ERA to same-sex marriages. But no case specifically overrules Singer.

However, Singer is a weak reed on which to support this issue. One difficulty is that Singer assumes the point that is in contention. They conclude that although one can not discriminate on the basis of sex, that there is no discrimination in forbidding same-sex marriage because there is no such thing as same-sex marriage, so on what basis is there any discrimination? If this kind of reasoning were acceptable then Loving would never have struck down Virginia’s anti-miscegenation laws since by ‘definition’ there was no marriage allowed between different races, so as long as each race could marry, what discrimination was there if they could not marry each other? In the 1974 eyes of Singer, there is no discrimination, since all males can marry and all females can marry, only they just can’t marry each other due to their same sex status based on the definition of what counts as marriage. But a conclusion reached in this way begs the analysis. If by ‘definition’ marriage can only exist between opposite sexes then what further analysis is necessary?

The problem arises because marriage doesn’t only involve two parties. It is a civil contract, approved by the government, that qualifies the parties, and any children involved, with real and significant benefits that are denied to those relationships which the government will not approve. One needs government approval to enter into a valid contract of this kind and also needs government approval to end the contract, which we call “divorce.” There are obvious benefits in health care, privacy, community property, survivor benefits, legal obligations to each other, and so on, that result to the benefit of adult parties of such a contract. Perhaps more important, however, is that children born or adopted during the duration of such a state approved contract gain significant rights in relationship to all parties to the contract and even the state will not allow the contract to be dissolved
without taking into account how the dissolution might affect the children and see, to the extent possible, that they are protected. The state approves same sex couples adopting children. The overall community concern with children is permanency planning on their behalf. Yet, the state does not require the permanency of a binding contract between same sex couples the way it requires such a contract with opposite sex couples.

That should be clear enough to state legislators, and supporters of a Federal "marriage amendment": you will not avoid the unconstitutionality of discriminatory legislation by a making restrictive legal definition part of the constitution. Unfortunately, some state have already done so, including the one I live in. Expect challenges to those on the same grounds -- equal protection -- and expect them to succeed.

From the Conclusion (pages 36-38):

The clear intent of the Legislature to limit government approved contracts of marriage to opposite sex couples is in direct conflict with the constitutional intent to not allow a privilege to one class of the community that is not allowed to the entire community. To the extent RCW 26.04.010 and RCW 26.04.020* effect this they are contrary to the state Constitution.

Who are we as a community? Our fundamental principle is that we share the freedom to live with and respect each other and share the same privileges or immunities. We need each other. Are we not all children of a common parent?

When the government is involved, one part of the community can not be given a privilege that is not given to other members of the community unless the government can demonstrate how that discrimination furthers the benefit of the entire community.

When we divide the community into classes and categories the division must at least bear some rational relation to a legitimate government purpose. If this division is based on ‘suspect’ lines, such as immutable characteristics that a person can’t change such as race, sex, age and so on, or, involves a fundamental right, such as marriage or to bear children, then the discriminatory division is looked at closely and must be narrowly tailored to advance the particular government interest.

For the government this is not a moral issue. It is a legal issue. Though these issues are often the same, they are also quite different. The conscience of the community is not the same as the morality of any particular class. Conscience is what we feel together as one community. Conscience makes us one people. What fails strict scrutiny here is a government approved civil contract for one class of the community not given to another class of the community. Democracy means people with different values living together as one people. What can reconcile our differences is the feeling that with these differences we are still one people. This is the democracy of conscience.

At the risk of mixing religion with government, I say, "Amen."

[* -- The codes cited were amended by the State of Washington's "Defense of Marriage Act", based on the Federal law of the same name -- see the opinion, p. 3]