One things for sure – given Saddam’s long track record of pursuing WMD, and his many deceptions to hide them from UN inspectors, we certainly had very good reason to believe Saddam either still had WMD, or would certainly seek to acquire them again at the first opportunity.

There’s simply no way we could take a chance and allow someone as ruthless and dangerous as Saddam Hussein to get his hands on such weapons – or use ones he probably already has.

Saddam's gone and the world’s a little safer now, thank Allah!!

Still no smoking gun...

Unanswered questions

“…When the U.N. inspectors left Iraq in 1998, they concluded, for example, that Iraq was still withholding drawings showing the latest stage of its nuclear weapon design. In addition, they found that Iraq was withholding blueprints of individual nuclear weapon components - including the precise dimensions of explosive lenses - and drawings showing how to mate Iraq's nuclear warhead with a missile. Iraq claimed that these things either did not exist or were no longer in its possession. Iraq had also failed to turn over documents revealing how far it got in developing centrifuges to process uranium to weapon-grade, and failed to provide 170 technical reports it received showing how to produce and operate the centrifuges. Iraq claimed that all these documents were secretly destroyed. Nor did Iraq account for materials and equipment belonging to its most advanced nuclear weapon design team. In fact, Saddam Hussein took pains to keep his nuclear teams together and to prevent any of their members from leaving the country. A dossier released by the British government in September 2002 noted that Iraq "recalled its nuclear scientists to the programme in 1998."

In the chemical weapon domain, the inspectors found that Iraq refused to account for at least 3.9 tons of VX, the deadliest form of nerve gas, and at least 600 tons of ingredients to make it. Iraq produced the gas but had claimed it was of low quality and that all of the ingredients to make it were either destroyed or consumed during production attempts. Also missing were up to 3,000 tons of other poison gas agents that Iraq had admitted producing but said were used, destroyed or thrown away, and several hundred additional tons of agents Iraq could have produced with the 4,000 tons of missing ingredients it admitted was at its disposal. Iraq also admitted producing or possessing 500 bombs with parachutes to deliver gas or germ payloads, roughly 550 artillery shells filled with mustard gas, 107,500 casings prepared for various chemical munitions, and 31,658 filled and empty chemical munitions - all of which Iraq claimed were destroyed or lost, a fact that inspectors have been unable to verify. Many key records were also missing. These included "cookbooks" showing how Iraq operated its poison gas plants.

Nor did the inspectors ever learn the total amount of germ warfare agent that Iraq produced (anthrax, botulinum, gas gangrene, aflatoxin). The inspectors learned only that Iraq's production capacity far exceeded what it admitted producing. Iraq simply alleged that its production facilities were not run at full capacity, a claim directly contradicted by its all-out drive to mass-produce germ warfare agents. Inspectors concluded that Iraq retained at least 157 aerial bombs and 25 missile warheads filled with germ agents, spraying equipment to deliver germ agents by helicopter, and possessed enough growth media to generate three or four times the amount of anthrax it admitted producing. Iraq either claimed that these items were destroyed unilaterally, claimed they were used for civilian purposes or simply refused to explain what happened to them. Nor could the inspectors account for the results of a known project to deliver germ agents by drop tanks or account for much of the equipment Iraq used to produce germ agents. Finally, Iraq contended that many essential records of its biological weapon program, such as log books of materials purchased, lists of imported ingredients, and lists of stored ingredients, simply "cannot be found."

Questions also remain about the missiles Iraq was trying to develop to deliver these agents. The most explicit questions were those posed in the September 2002 British dossier. The British alleged that in 2002 Iraq had begun to develop missiles with a range of more than 1,000 km, a violation of the 150 km range permitted under U.N. resolutions. The allegations also said that a shorter-range Iraqi missile, the liquid propellant al-Samoud, had been deployed to military units and that at least 50 had been produced. Iraq was also trying to extend its range to at least 200 km, another violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. The solid-fueled Ababil-100 missile was also being produced, with plans to extend its range as well to 200 km. As proof of its findings, the British dossier presented a photograph of a new Iraqi rocket test stand capable of testing engines with ranges exceeding 1,000 km.

In addition to these shorter-range missiles, the dossier said Iraq had retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles in breach of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. These missiles have a range of up to 650 km and can carry conventional, chemical or biological warheads. They could reach as far as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel. The dossier's estimate conflicts with the estimate of U.N. inspectors, who when they left in December 1998 said that Iraq could still possess up to nine ballistic missiles, plus imported guidance components. Also unaccounted for were up to 150 tons of missile production materials and Iraq's stockpile of liquid rocket fuel. “