The process was Nixon inviting Fletcher over, told him he could either use solid boosters for the shuttle or the shuttle would be cancelled and NASA would have to use Titan IIIs for its launch needs. Instead of going to the private sector for launches and shuttting down Marshall and more, Fletcher went with the solids,
thus setting the stage for the mess we have today.
Of course, it was Reagsn's apporoving after Challenger for the re-entry into the launch business of firms with antiquated designs that was the icing on the cake. That was on a par with Reagan's decision to privatize Earth imaging too early, which had equelly disasterous results.
We don't have any names, as lobbyists leave few traces.
von Braun left NASA shortly after the solid booster deicion to try and build a type of "internet" using com satellites, small dishes, and mainframe servers with Fairchild in Maryland.
Goldin and DoD had nearly straightened out the ELV mess when an attempt at industrial espionage by two men brought that effort to an end.
We are stumbling, but it has been in what has been percieved as a forward direction. Of course, that forard direction is in reality reverse in comparison with the rapid advances of other nations.
To quote Tommy Chong, "Hey man, don't let's get all bummed out or nothing, man."
Space/Science » in reply to Process vs. results
Process and result
The whole thread (21 posts)
- If you had economy of scale, what would be cheapest conventional rocket to get a lot of a mass to orbit?
- Your framework of assumptions is completely unrealistic
- Musk's "Falcon" launchers are turbopump fed.
- I am an engineer just trying to understand design space tradeoffs
- Why the snark? If you don't want to play then don't play. (n/t)
- re: If you had economy of scale, what would be cheapest conventional rocket to get a lot of a mass to orbit?
- SeaDragon is one end of the curve
- Your framework of assumptions is completely unrealistic
