From Jerry Pournelle's website:

On 26 April, 2002, BGen Mattis (Commander, TF 58, Operation Enduring Freedom) addressed the Ground Dinner sponsored by PP&O for GCE Advocacy. A variety of interesting comments from BGen Mattis, in no particular order:



* KC130 is aircraft that made it all happen

* Marine pilots landed where and when others wouldn't

* If we had V-22, they could have gone straight to Kandahar and toppled it 30 days earlier

* SeaBees are MAGNIFICENT! There are no better military engineers--they have unheralded initiative and innovation

* Dust was truly unbelievable

* Common bond w/ SF was desire to engage enemy relentlessly; made for effective on-site partnership based on a handshake, even if macro organizational relationship remains complex

* Sea-Basing was key; also all landing was night ops only to reduce vulnerability (political as much as any) and ARG withdrew OTH each morning

* Marine Corps Intelligence Agency (MCIA) responsiveness and products via reachback were outstanding: route Rhino to Kandahar across hellish terrain in 12 hrs; Tora Bora LZ study right on target in ~4 hours

* Intel is getting so good that risk of having so much info that can't process it

* CSS gave the operation legs. Huge impact from a few CSS Marines headcount tightly managed). CSS was definitely his focus, as MEU, etc. could take care of the tactics as long as the order and intent were right. Despite distances and other myriad challenges, tactics were never constrained by CSS.

* Time for non-aviators to call for CAS.

* Left arty on the boat. Air filled gap nicely. Would have needed Expeditionary Fire Spt System (EFSS) if had a more capable enemy.

* Relationship with JFACC was key; needed to be face-to-face in order to build trust then get what you need. Can't do that through ATOs and VTCs (the latter the curse of today).

* Need UAV at all levels. It will always be so valuable that your higher wants it. Need for Co Comdr and all the way up. Need to be small and capable, but sufficiently expendable that losing one or two is no big deal.

* Lack of a sniper night scope created strategic impact.

* JTF Enabler Package (C2 - theater comms package for JTF) very good.

* Thinks USMC should go inside the tier I force -- not to try to duplicate, but to establish liaison and get entry to a world that is relevant to tier II, MEU(SOC), etc.

* Questioned on whether getting rid of ANGLICO a good idea -- can't have enough liaison folks or enough teams that can employ broad spectrum of supporting arms.

* Don't enter caves. Seal them by blowing them up. Need a way to find all outlets, so can blow all of them up.

* Had only "inch by inch" mine clearing capability until Norwegian flail arrived. Need to fix that. Dogs?

* The other countries were sending the best of the best. Highly capable coalition forces (the 1st world imports).

* Aussie got order from BGen Mattis then had permission to execute from Prime Minister in 2 1/2 hours. Need to have that kind of responsiveness in NCA / can't say that.

* "Go after them until they fear us more than they hate us."

* Guidance to operators was that Taliban's first contacts with us should make them not want a second contact.

* Advice to junior officers: never say that you own a piece of Afghanistan.



Being a non-military type, a lot of this (like most of the acronyms) went over my head, but it might be of interest to those of you that are military types.