Being dyslexic, I've always hated 'em...

* Sea-Basing was key; also all landing was night ops only to reduce vulnerability (political as much as any) and Amphibious Ready Group (ARG -- Also ARG/MEU) withdrew Over The Horizon (OTH) each morning.

* Combat Service Support (CSS) gave the operation legs. Huge impact from a few CSS Marines headcount tightly managed). CSS was definitely his focus, as Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), etc. could take care of the tactics as long as the order and intent were right. Despite distances and other myriad challenges, tactics were never constrained by CSS.

* Relationship with Joint Force Air Component Commander Course (JFACC) was key; needed to be face-to-face in order to build trust then get what you need. Can't do that through Air Tasking Orders (ATOs) and Video Telephone Conferences (VTCs) (the latter the curse of today).

* Joint Task Force (JTF) Enabler Package (C2 - theater comms package for JTF) very good.

* Thinks USMC should go inside the tier I force -- not to try to duplicate, but to establish liaison and get entry to a world that is relevant to tier II, Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [MEU(SOC)], etc.

* Questioned on whether getting rid of Air & Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies (ANGLICO) a good idea -- can't have enough liaison folks or enough teams that can employ broad spectrum of supporting arms.

Dan