BTW, just for fun, on that De Gaulle bit:

Kerry:

I mean, we can remember when President Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis sent his secretary of state to Paris to meet with DeGaulle. And in the middle of the discussion, to tell them about the missiles in Cuba, he said, "Here, let me show you the photos." And DeGaulle waved them off and said, "No, no, no, no. The word of the president of the United States is good enough for me."

Dean Achenson wasn't Secretary of State at the time.

A more accurate quote from this source:

After I had completed the first draft of this memorandum, I saw Mr. Acheson, who told me the following about his discussion with de Gaulle. When he had conveyed his message he told the General that there was an intelligence officer waiting outside to brief him on the evidence. General de Gaulle's response was that he needed no such evidence; he was satisfied with Mr. Acheson's account; after all, President Kennedy obviously would not have sent a man of Mr. Acheson's eminence to give him misinformation. Mr. Acheson said he thought the General would be interested.

De Gaulle then thoroughly examined the photographs.

Incidentally, Kennedy had decided to blockade Cuba--unilaterally--before he sent people out with explanations.

During the seven days between the President's learning of the Soviet's emplacement of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba and his speech announcing it, a few score principal officers of the Executive Branch worked endlessly and in unpenetrated secrecy. Except for the President, the members of the so-called Ex Comm (the ad hoc executive committee of the NSC), and the top echelon of the intelligence community, few indeed of our fellow countrymen knew what was going on and why, and practically no one in the governments of our allies. Until the President was ready to act, the Russians must not know that we knew their secret, and, when we were ready to act, our allies should know our chosen course before our adversaries. It was to this end that the Ex Comm drafted for the President's approval a timetable of consecutive actions which included the briefings of the chiefs of government of our principal allies.

At A hour of D day (a time which became 1900 EDST, Monday 22 October) the President was to tell publicly what was wrong in Cuba and what the US Government proposed to do about it. At about A minus 12, the British were to receive formal advance notice; about four hours later, the French and the Germans; and later still the Canadians.(2) Our ambassadors were to call upon the chiefs of government, deliver personal letters from the President and a copy of the speech to be delivered that night, and make whatever oral comment was appropriate. Each of them was also to have copies of the air photos and (for the presentations to the British, French, Germans, and Canadians) an intelligence officer from CIA Headquarters to brief and answer questions as necessary.

Not quite the picture we're supposed to get from Kerry's remarks. There isn't the slightest hint that Kennedy would change his course if objections were raised.

The U.N. does not figure prominently in this.

If I had nothing else to do with myself, I could do this for Kerry's entire debate performance. Of course, compared to his smoothness of performance, the facts mean very little.