Chris,

Please note: I have just about every document ever published about planetary qaurantine and planetary protection. I am very infromed and up to date. Here is a sampling of a few abstracts from COSPAR alone:

In the context of extraterrestrial exploration missions and since the beginning of solar system exploration, it is required, according to the article IX of the Outer Space Treaty (London/Washington January 27, 1967) to preserve planets and the Earth from cross contamination. Consequently, COSPAR (Committee of Space Research) has established some planetary protection recommendations in order to protect the environments of other worlds from biological contamination by terrestrial microorganisms, to protect exobiological science for searching for life on planets, and to protect the Earth's environment from back contamination.

Under existing COSPAR policy adopted in 1984, missions to Mars (landers, probes, and some orbiters) are designated as Category IV missions. As such, the procedures for implementing planetary protection requirements could include trajectory biasing, cleanrooms, bioload reduction, sterilization of hardware, and bioshields. In 1992, a U.S. National Research Council study recommended that controls on forward contamination of Mars be tied to specific mission objectives. The report recommended that Mars landers with life detection instruments be subject to at least Viking-level sterilization procedures for bioload reduction, while spacecraft (including orbiters) without life detection instruments be subject to at least Viking-level pre-sterilization procedures for bioload reduction but need not be sterilized. In light of this, it is proposed that the current policy's Category IV and its planetary protection requirements be divided into two sub-categories as follows: Category IVa, for missions comprising landers and probes without life detection experiments, which will meet a specified bioburden limit for exposed surfaces, and Category IVb, for landers and probes with life detection experiments, which will require sterilization of landed systems. In addition, Category III orbiter mission specifications are expanded to be consistent with these recommendations.

Abstract
A workshop was convened to discuss the subject of planetary protection implementation for Mars lander missions. It was sponsored and organized by the Exobiology Implementation Team of the U.S./Russian Joint Working Group on Space Biomedical and Life Support Systems. The objective of the workshop was to discuss planetary protection issues for the Russian Mars '94 mission, which is currently under development, as well as for additional future Mars lander missions including the planned Mars '96 and U.S. MESUR Pathfinder and Network missions. A series of invited presentations was made to ensure that workshop participants had access to information relevant to the planned discussions. The topics summarized in this report include exobiology science objectives for Mars exploration, current international policy on planetary protection, planetary protection requirements developed for earlier missions, mission plans and designs for future U.S. and Russian Mars landers, biological contamination of spacecraft components, and techniques for spacecraft bioload reduction. In addition, the recent recommendations of the U.S. Space Studies Board (SSB) on this subject were also summarized. Much of the discussion focused on the recommendations of the SSB. The SSB proposed relaxing the planetary protection requirements for those Mars lander missions that do not contain life detection experiments, but maintaining Viking-like requirements for those missions that do contain life detection experiments. The SSB recommendations were found to be acceptable as a guide for future missions, although many questions and concerns about interpretation were raised and are summarized. Significant among the concerns was the need for more quantitative guidelines to prevent misinterpretation by project offices and better access to and use of the Viking data base of bio-assays to specify microbial burden targets. Among the questions raised were how will the SSB recommendations be integrated with existing Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) policy and how will they apply to and affect Mars '94, Mars '96, MESUR Pathfinder, and MESUR Network missions? One additional topic briefly considered at the workshop was the identification of some issues related to planetary protection considerations for Mars sample return missions. These issues will form the basis for a follow-on joint U.S./Russian workshop on that subject.

Abstract
Over the last several years, the nature of the surface conditions on the planet Mars, our knowledge of the growth capabilities of Earth organisms under extreme conditions, and future opportunities for Mars exploration have been under extensive review in the United States and elsewhere. As part of these examinations, in 1992 the US Space Studies Board made a series of recommendations to NASA on the requirements that should be implemented on future missions that will explore Mars. In particular, significant changes were recommended in the requirements for Mars landers, changes that significantly alleviated the burden of planetary protection implementation for these missions. In this paper we propose a resolution implementing this new set of recommendations, for adoption by COSPAR at its 30th meeting in Hamburg. We also discuss future directions and study areas for planetary protection, in light of changing plans for Mars exploration.

Abstract
Under existing COSPAR policy adopted in 1984, missions to Mars (landers, probes, and some orbiters) are designated as Category IV missions. As such, the procedures for implementing planetary protection requirements could include trajectory biasing, cleanrooms, bioload reduction, sterilization of hardware, and bioshields. In 1992, a U.S. National Research Council study recommended that controls on forward contamination of Mars be tied to specific mission objectives. The report recommended that Mars landers with life detection instruments be subject to at least Viking-level sterilization procedures for bioload reduction, while spacecraft (including orbiters) without life detection instruments be subject to at least Viking-level pre-sterilization procedures for bioload reduction but need not be sterilized. In light of this, it is proposed that the current policy's Category IV and its planetary protection requirements be divided into two sub-categories as follows: Category IVa, for missions comprising landers and probes without life detection experiments, which will meet a specified bioburden limit for exposed surfaces, and Category IVb, for landers and probes with life detection experiments, which will require sterilization of landed systems. In addition, Category III orbiter mission specifications are expanded to be consistent with these recommendations.

COSPAR report to United Nations 1996: Satellite Dynamics

Abstract
As scientists and mission planners develop planetary protection requirements for future Mars sample return missions, they must recognize the socio-political context in which decisions about the mission will be made and pay careful attention to public concerns about potential back contamination of Earth. To the extent that planetary protection questions are unresolved or unaddressed at the time of an actual mission, they offer convenient footholds for public challenges in both legal and decision making realms, over which NASA will have little direct control. In this paper, two particular non-scientific areas of special concern are discussed in detail: 1) legal issues and 2) the decision making process. Understanding these areas is critical for addressing legitimate public concerns as well as for fulfilling procedural requirements regardless whether sample return evokes public controversy. Legal issues with the potential to complicate future missions include: procedural review under NEPA; uncertainty about institutional control and authority; conflicting regulations and overlapping jurisdictions; questions about international treaty obligations and large scale impacts; uncertainties about the nature of the organism; and constitutional and regulatory concerns about quarantine, public health and safety. In light of these important legal issues, it is critical that NASA consider the role and timing of public involvement in the decision making process as a way of anticipating problem areas and preparing for legitimate public questions and challenges to sample return

Abstract
The purpose of the workshop was to re-evaluate the existing guidelines for the probability of growth of terrestrial organisms on Mars that were established by the National Academy of Sciences following the Viking Mission. A panel of specialists in microbiology and allied fields reviewed this issue in the light of current information about the physical and chemical environments expected on Mars. Their deliberations resulted in the virtually unanimous conclusion that the existing Pg guidelines were either appropriate or that the values for Pg should be further reduced. Individual assessments of this problem by each of the participants, together with those of additional invited experts are included.

Abstract

A primary scientific theme for the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) is the search for life, extant or extinct, on Mars. Because of this, concerns have arisen about Planetary Protection (PP), the prevention of biological cross-contamination between Earth and other planets during solar system exploration missions. A recent workshop assessed the necessity for, and impact of, PP requirements on the unmanned and human missions to Mars comprising the SEI. The following ground-rules were adopted: (1) Information needed for assessing PP issues must be obtained during the unmanned precursor mission phase prior to human landings. (2) Returned Mars samples will be considered biologically hazardous until proven otherwise. (3) Deposition of microbes on Mars and exposure of the crew to martian materials are inevitable when humans land. And (4) Human landings are unlikely until it is demonstrated that there is no harmful effect of martian materials on terrestrial life forms. These ground-rules dictated the development of a conservative PP strategy for precursor missions. Key features of the proposed strategy include: to prevent forward-contamination, all orbiters will follow Mars Observer PP procedures for assembly, trajectory, and lifetime. All landers will follow Viking PP procedures for assembly, microbial load reduction, and bio-shield. And, to prevent back-contamination, all sample return missions will have PP requirements which include fail-safe sample sealing, breaking contact chain with the martian surface, and containment and quarantine analysis in Earth-based laboratory. In addition to deliberating on scientific and technical issues, the workshop made several recommendations for dealing with forward and back-contamination concerns from non-scicntific perspectives.

Abstract
A key feature of the Space Exploration Initiative involves human missions to Mars. The report describing the initiative cites the search for life on Mars, extant or extinct, as one of the five science themes for such an endeavor. Because of this, concerns for planetary protection (PP) have arisen of two fronts: (1) forward contamination of Mars by spacecraft-borne terrestrial microbes which could interfere with exobiological analyses; and (2) back contamination of Earth by species that may be present in returned Mars samples. The United States is also signatory to an international treaty designed to protect Earth and planets from harmful cross-contamination during exploration. Therefore, it is timely to assess the necessity for, and impact of, PP procedures on the mission set comprising the human exploration of Mars. The ground-rules adopted at a recent workshop which addressed PP questions of this type are presented. In addition, the workshop produced several recommendations for dealing with forward and back contamination concerns for non-scientific perspectives, including public relations, legal, regulatory, international, and environmental.

In the United States, NASA has interpreted the National Environmental Policy Act as requiring "consideration of the possible environmental effects of any NASA actions at the earliest stages of study and planning" in order for recommendations and decisions to be made with full knowledge and understanding of the likely environmental effects. NASA will also have to respond to government regulatory agencies with authority over quarantine, environmental or safety areas.

There is so much material about humans and forward contamination, all you have to do is look for it on the web.

BD