Yes, after the inspector's work, Iraq was forced to admit she had conducted a clandestine, unlawful nuclear weapons program, but by all accounts I've seen, including your documentation, Iraq was a long way from having a nuclear weapons production capability:

12-15-92:
"The operation of a production scale uranium-enrichment centrifuge cascade, given the state of Iraqi centrifuge technology when work stopped, would have required the foreign procurement of large numbers of finished components. Inspections found no evidence of this."

Everything I can find says that Iraq in 1991 may have been able to scrape together enough weapon's grade material to have constructed a single, crude device that may or may not have worked, and for which she had no means of delivery.

According to all accounts, while Iraq was deceptive, lied repeatedly, would not allow inspectors access to certain "palaces," and forceably retrieved some material from the inspectors, according to those same inspectors, she had nowhere near the technological base to begin production of weapons grade materials.

Or, as this article from the 1993 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists summarizes:

"According to nuclear weapons experts who examined the evidence compiled by the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq at the time of the Gulf War, Iraq was about three years away from producing its first atomic weapon. The destruction of its nuclear facilities, both during and after the war, has been a major setback to its efforts. But even so, the possibility exists that once sanctions are lifted, Iraq will be able to rebuild its program in a few years."

sp