Mazanek has not come out against the ESAS spacecraft designs you have. You are one claiming manned Moon mission spacecraft should have NO commonality with manned Mars mission spacecraft. I ask were do you get your expertise in this area?

Commonality is the only way we can afford the both missions. A spacecraft built for Mars is over engineered for the Moon, but the reverse is not true. So logically you would design spacecraft able to land on Mars and go backwards from there.

From the orignial source for your "quote" and it's requirement in both places...
<a href="http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/133896main_ESAS_rollout_press.pdf"http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/133896main_ESAS_rollout_press.pdf

Finally, we believe this architecture is significantly safer and more reliable than previous human space flare architectures that the United States has had available. It is sized to provide a minimum of two lunar missions per year, but clearly more can be done depending of, again, the go as you can afford to pay philosophy. It provides a 125 metric ton class launch vehicle for lunar exploration and later Mars missions and beyond.

There's been an enormous amount of study done on Mars missions and most of those converge on the requirement that at least several hundred metric tons are required in order to mount a reasonable voyage to Mars. That can be done with four, five, six launches of the heavy lifter that we developed for the lunar architecture, off of pads at--pads 39

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(a) and (b) at complex 39 at Kennedy Space Center, launching on five or six-week centers. We can put the Mars payload together in low earth orbit in a few months with a few launches.

Indeed, it was that requirement to be able to service a reasonable Mars architecture with what is known today about going to Mars that drove this style of lunar exploration. So, we started with the requirement for what we would have to do to get to Mars and worked backward.

The crew ascent system offers, we believe, considerably more safety than the Space Shuttle, using apples to apples, probabilistic risk analysis approaches. The existing figure for the Space Shuttle is one in 220 failure rare, whereas for the crew launch vehicle, the system that you have seen, will have approximately one in 2,000, so a factor of ten improvement on crew safety. That is achieved by means of the escape tower, which you saw on the top, the abort system as well, of course, the inline use of the shuttle solid rocket boosters and the new
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upper stage.
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